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ABSTRACT 
The medical system in the United States is comprised of many different agencies and 
organizations that need coordination in order to provide optimal care for individual 
patients created by a mass-casualty incident or public-health emergency. This 
coordination of all the medical system components has been a challenge in the past, and 
the medical operations center (MOC) has been one relatively new concept utilized by 
some jurisdictions to address that challenge.  
The public-health system, in contrast to the medical system, focuses on the care 
provided to the entire community or large population group. Are the two systems 
different? Are they mutually exclusive? Can the medical operations center meet the 
coordination needs of the medical community? 
This thesis uses surveys of medical system leaders and a qualitative analysis of 
focus group discussion from jurisdictions currently using an MOC. The thesis begins 
with a description of the medical system and the challenges that currently exist for 
coordination and response. Collaboration barriers and facilitators are discussed along 
with the difference between the two systems. A section of the thesis examines the origins 
and current functions of four existing medical operations centers in Oklahoma City, 
Tulsa, Houston, and San Antonio. 
The findings support the argument that the two systems are indeed different, but 
not mutually exclusive. The data also strongly support the MOC as a means of 
coordinating the medical system if done in concert with public-health agencies.  
The thesis concludes with a proposal, conceptual design, and argument to build a 
national network of medical operations centers in order to enhance the medical system 
response to a mass-casualty incident or public-health emergency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 3, 1999, Alan Paxton1 sat in an outpatient side room at Hillcrest 
Hospital, slowly dying in plain sight. He, along with over 100 others, had been a victim 
of an F-5 tornado that struck Oklahoma City, and he had been initially screened as a 
minor injury. Mr. Paxton was transferred to an overflow area of the heavily affected 
Hillcrest Hospital and monitored by staff nurses from the medical/surgical floor who 
were unfamiliar with trauma assessment. Only when he passed out from internal bleeding 
did the staff realize that something was amiss. Meanwhile, 24 emergency nurses reported 
for duty at Mercy Hospital located 12 miles from the same affected area. They had 
responded to their hospital’s disaster declaration but treated only eight minor injuries. 
They spent most of the time watching the events unfold on the television.2 
Could Hillcrest Hospital have benefited from the expertise and services of the 
underutilized nurses at Mercy? Would the Mercy nurses have come to assist if requested? 
Would Mr. Paxton have fared better if emergency nurses skilled in assessing subtle but 
life-threatening injuries had monitored him? The answer to these questions is a 
resounding yes. Unfortunately for Mr. Paxton, there was no coordinating mechanism in 
place to let Hillcrest Hospital know of the available resource or to let Mercy Hospital 
know of the need. Fortunately for Mr. Paxton, his deteriorating condition was noticed, 
and he belatedly received the attention and treatment his condition required. His 
experience, however, points out the potential benefit of a functioning medical system 
coordinating structure during a mass-casualty incident. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
One of the main goals of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatening 
the United States is to create mass casualties during an attack as part of their overall plan 
to instill fear and panic into the general population. The United States is also subject to 
                                                 
1 The patient’s name has been changed to protect his identity. 
2 Karl Lafoon, Charge Nurse, Hillcrest Hospital Emergency Department, interview by author, June 13, 
1999, Oklahoma City, OK. 
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numerous natural and industrial disasters that have the potential to create a large number 
of killed and injured people. The highest priority for Homeland Security’s prevention and 
response activities is to stop, mitigate, and effectively respond to incidents that directly 
threaten the life and safety of our citizens.  
These factors should place the local and state medical systems in the forefront of 
Homeland Security prevention and response strategies. Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 21 (HSPD-21), released in October 2007, acknowledges the importance of a 
robust capability within the medical systems around the country. Yet, a cursory review of 
past incidents shows a repeated lack of coordination and integration within the medical 
communities during a large incident involving a significant number of casualties. 
The medical system, defined by HSPD-21, is a complex collection of 
organizations and entities that provide care to individual patients. These organizations 
include, but are not limited to, EMS agencies, hospitals, long-term care facilities, 
rehabilitation centers, mental health centers, and dialysis units. Most of these facilities are 
located within the private sector, compete financially with each other, and face daily 
challenges of providing service to their patients. Yet, during a mass-casualty incident, 
these disparate components of the medical system must come together and address a 
sudden surge of patients.  
There may need to be some type of entity or system to facilitate the integration 
and coordination of these disparate organizations in order to ensure that the victims of a 
terrorist attack, natural disaster, industrial accident, or evolving public-health emergency 
receive the optimal level of care. 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
Should a medical system coordination entity such as a medical operations center 
(MOC) be established at the local, state, and federal level to meet the integration and 
coordination needs of the medical community during a mass-casualty incident? 
In order to answer the primary research question, I will need to address several 
other corollary questions: 
 3
What constitutes the “medical system” and what challenges does the system face 
during a mass-casualty incident or public-health emergency? 
Where would these centers be located, who would operate and fund them, and 
what potential challenges could be encountered during their creation?  
What would be required to facilitate effective collaboration among the different 
organizations? 
What functions would such centers perform? 
How could the difference between individual-based care performed by the 
medical system and the population-based care performed by public-health agencies affect 
implementation and functionality? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While incidents creating mass casualties have occurred throughout our nation’s 
history, recent natural disasters, identified problems with an aging infrastructure, and the 
specter of terrorism creating acts of mass lethality have demonstrated an increased 
likelihood and frequency of incidents that will stress the medical response system. The 
current medical system is extremely fragile and operates within an environment of 
reduced capacity, marginal profits, and questionable survival. While the threat is 
increasing, the capability to respond faces stronger challenges every year. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether there is a need for a medical 
system coordination entity at the local and regional level in order to facilitate the optimal 
utilization of medical system resources. Part of that determination involves understanding 
the definition and components of the medical system as well as its organizational 
structure and behavior. There must also be a demonstrated need for coordination and 
communication, and a study of current models should be undertaken. The actual or 
perceived barriers encountered by these current models, and their relative success or 
failure also factor into the determination of need.  
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The availability of relevant literature varies depending on the investigated factor 
from the list above. Several compelling studies, reports, and directives demonstrate the 
need for a robust medical system that can respond to a disaster.  
There are certainly common perceptions of what comprises the “medical system” 
in the United States, but the literature provides few clear definitions in the context of 
disaster preparedness and response. Most documents addressing disaster response tend to 
include the medical system in the general context of public health. This may result from a 
view that the majority of the medical system components are private for-profit 
organizations regulated by federal or state public-health agencies. Another cause for this 
conclusion may arise from describing desired goals for the resolution of a disaster. The 
language tends to focus on the community aspect (a public-health venue) instead of 
addressing the needs of any particular individual. The majority of medical and public-
health funding programs at the national level, and the grant guidance that accompanies 
them, originate from the public-health-centric U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. All of these factors may explain the lack of separation between public-health 
and medical systems in the literature.  
There is a need to separate the medical system from the public-health system 
because the two are different entities and often have different needs, responsibilities, and 
areas of operation. A general tension exists between the two systems that can translate 
into challenges when situations require the medical needs of the community to be 
addressed during a disaster or public-health emergency. The differences can create an 
interesting dichotomy: two distinctly different systems whose overall goal is the health of 
an individual, and collectively, the health of society. 
Fortunately, there is some recognition in the literature of the differences. The 
recent Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 actually differentiates between the 
two systems by defining “medical” as the “science and practice of maintenance of health 
and prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and alleviation of disease or injury and the 
provision of those services to individuals” (emphasis added).3 The directive further 
                                                 
3 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21. 
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defines “public health” as “the science and practice of protecting and improving the 
overall health of the community through disease prevention and early diagnosis, control 
of communicable diseases, health education, injury prevention, sanitation, and protection 
from environmental hazards” (emphasis added).4  
For-profit institutions seeking reimbursement from federal and state programs 
such as Medicare and Medicaid seek accreditation by an external organization. A review 
of the numerous standards and guidance documents from the largest accreditation 
organization also helps define the components of the medical system. The standards 
cover hospitals, clinics, physicians’ offices, long-term care facilities, assisted-living 
centers, dialysis units, and mental-health institutions.5 Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) utilizes its own accrediting bodies and would be included due to the individual 
patient services it offers.  
An excellent reference to demonstrate the difference between public health and 
the medical system components is Laurie Garret’s 2000 book entitled Betrayal of Trust: 
The Collapse of Global Public Health.6 She spends an entire chapter describing the 200-
year evolution of both public-health and medical-care systems in the United States. She 
describes the differences and the origins of both systems and demonstrates how public 
health and medical care can actually be at odds with one another. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the discussion will focus on those components that provide medical and health 
services to individuals and will not address the community public-health aspect. While 
the two are different, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, success in one area very 
often determines the success in the other. 
The organizational structure and behavior of the medical system during an 
emergency may help identify mechanisms needed to facilitate coordination. Two 
questions arise about the system. Is the system a network and subject to established 
relationships and lines of authority? Is the system adaptable and able to function in the 
                                                 
4 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21. 
5 Joint Commission, “Accreditation Programs.” 
6 Garrett, Betrayal of Trust. See especially 268–486. 
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rapidly changing environment that accompanies a disaster? There is a significant amount 
of literature to demonstrate that the medical system is a network. In fact, many health-
care facilities advertise and advocate their involvement in networks. One article points 
out how networked organizations actually require more coordination: “Because the 
members of network organizations come from various backgrounds, most alliance 
coalitions or networks are unstable. Also, due to the ‘vague network’ found between 
different organizations, it is required for much more coordination and integration here.”7 
In most areas of the country, the medical system tends to center around clearly 
identifiable hubs located in major urban areas or major universities. While it is relatively 
easy to show the network aspect of the medical system, it is far more difficult to 
addresses just how that network reacts during a disaster. The literature is relatively silent 
on the medical network response to disaster. 
The literature surrounding adaptive systems and the medical system is also 
relatively sparse. One can assume that the medical system is complex and adaptive, 
particularly to changes in payment mechanisms, clinical improvements, and regulatory 
requirements. What is lacking in the literature is just how quickly the system can adapt to 
a sudden change. Perhaps a review of past incidents involving disasters can shed some 
light on the capability of adapting quickly. 
A retrospective analysis of past mass-casualty incidents is one available method 
to determine the need for medical coordination. Such a review can help determine any 
consistency in the success or failure of medical-system coordination and 
communications. Fortunately, the literature is replete with after-action reports from 
various incidents in the nation’s past.  
The hospital system in south Florida formed “buddy systems” after hurricane 
Andrew in 1992.8 Oklahoma City hospitals were “working in silos” during the Oklahoma 
City Bombing but have since “formed an agreement in which they agree to share 
                                                 
7 Hu, Yang, and Chou, “Classifying Healthcare Network Relationships,” 670. 
8 Sabatino, “Stories of Survival,” 26. 
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resources, personnel, and time with the neediest of hospitals.”9 One of the 
recommendations following hurricane Katrina in New Orleans was “developing effective 
and resilient communications systems.”10 Exercise after-action reports, available in 
plentiful supply, can also supplement the reviews from previous incidents. Both these 
types of reports can show either where the need for a coordination entity existed or where 
a coordination entity in place actually facilitated effective patient disposition and care. 
An area that remains unexplored and unknown is the number of cities that already 
have medical-system coordinating centers in place. The literature does have sporadic 
descriptions of systems that have created an enhanced capability to coordinate the 
medical system, but there is no over-arching and comprehensive review of the national 
status of these centers. Anecdotally, we know that centers exist in San Antonio, Houston, 
Oklahoma City, and Tulsa. We also know that Virginia, California, New Jersey, and 
North Carolina have taken steps to facilitate medical system coordination. The overall 
picture is incomplete.  
As expected, few studies address the challenges and barriers that may be present 
should a jurisdiction decide to design and implement a medical operations center. Nitin 
Natarajan published a thesis from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security that 
outlines the need for, and the potential challenges to, the formation of a Domestic 
Medical Intelligence Center.11 In that paper Mr. Natarajan discusses some of the 
functions of the proposed centers. Since situational awareness relies on intelligence, 
many of his observations and conclusions will have relevance to the subject of medical 
operations centers. 
In 2006, Upton, Frost, and Havron described the Houston medical-system 
experience and the creation of a unified medical command infrastructure during 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They state, “During a disaster, a unified approach to medical  
 
                                                 
9 Meyers, “Disaster Preparedness,” 12. 
10 Rodriguez and Aguirre, “Hurricane Katrina and the Healthcare Infrastructure,” 13. 
11 Natarajan, “National Imperative to Establish a Domestic Medical Intelligence Center.” 
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command provides rapid facilitation of patient triage and placement in appropriate 
facilities, coordinates with local, regional, state and federal initiatives, and helps ensure a 
stable medical infrastructure.”12 
In early 2007, Maldin et al. published an article titled “Regional Approaches to 
Hospital Preparedness” in the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, 
Practice, and Science. In that article, the authors discuss research findings regarding 
regional coordination for hospital preparedness. One of the recommendations in the 
article was that “key operational functions of regional groups include the ability to 
coordinate the transfer, deployment, and distribution of patients, staff, and supplies and to 
make decisions regarding scarce medical resources and altering standards of care.”13 
There is a significant amount of published literature on the challenges that may 
confront the medical system during a disaster. There have also been proposed command 
and control processes that address the response to meet those challenges. Two separate 
groups of work have provided invaluable input into the thesis research. Dr. David Hogan, 
a practicing physician in Oklahoma City, has published research on medical disasters for 
years and is the editor of the definitive text on disaster medicine.14 Drs. Barbera and 
Macintyre, both emergency physicians, first developed an incident management–system 
process for medical and public-health coordination,15 and then expanded their work into a 
comprehensive document that identifies processes and issues for both medical system 
preparedness and response.16 They stop at describing just how to do it, hence, the need to 
further the process with additional work. 
D. ARGUMENT 
Recent disasters that created mass casualties or compromised the health-care 
system have demonstrated the need for better medical coordination. The patient 
                                                 
12 Upton, Frost, and Havron, “Operationalizing a Regional Unified Medical Command.” 
13 Maldin et al., “Regional Approaches to Hospital Preparedness.”  
14 Hogan and Burstein, Disaster Medicine. 
15 Barbera and Macintyre, Medical and Health Incident Management (MaHIM) System. 
16 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Medical Surge Capacity and Capability. 
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distribution from the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 resulted in an inordinate number 
of patients sent to the nearest hospitals, while large facilities a few miles farther away 
received proportionally far fewer patients.17 In 1996, Tulsa hospitals remained in disaster 
mode awaiting patients long after public safety agencies had cleared the scene. Public 
safety agencies failed to notify the hospital system that the threat had passed with 
relatively few injuries.18 The after-action report from the Oklahoma City tornado of May 
3, 1999, highlighted the fact that hospitals had acted as isolated islands with little 
communication and resource sharing.19 During the World Trade Center attack in 2001, 
most of the patients went to two nearby hospitals while a Level-1 Trauma Center three 
miles away stood idly by because there were no patients from the incident to treat at their 
location. Meanwhile, the two closest hospitals were overwhelmed with patients.20 During 
an arsine release in Tulsa, some hospitals admitted exposed patients for observation while 
other facilities released patients after an initial exam; this was a clearly inconsistent 
pattern that could have resulted in legal liability had there been a negative outcome for 
one of the released patients.  
During hurricane Katrina, the compromised hospitals in New Orleans had no 
means of communicating. 21 The Louisiana Hospital Association representative in the 
State EOC in Baton Rouge had one seat, was overwhelmed, and found it hard to 
determine what was going on in the New Orleans hospital system. The thousands of 
evacuees relocated to Houston created such a demand on that city’s medical system that 
Houston emergency management established a specific medical coordinating center right 
in the city’s EOC. There appears to be a strong record from past disasters that 
demonstrates the need for improved coordination and communication. 
                                                 
17 Kellison et al., “Immediate Hospital Impact of the Oklahoma City Bombing.” 
18 Tulsa Catoosa debriefing meeting, EMSA Headquarters, April 23, 1996. 
19 Tornado Medical Response after-action meeting, Greater Oklahoma City Hospital Council, June 13, 
1999. 
20 Simon and Teperman, “The World Trade Center Attack.” 
21 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, “A Summary of Four After-Action Reports on 
Hurricane Katrina.” 
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The current threat to Homeland Security also provides support for the importance 
of medical system coordination. The new, unconventional threat and asymmetric warfare 
doctrine demonstrated by the various components of Al Qaeda and its sympathizers has 
two chilling aspects: disregard for the lives of its proclaimed enemy and an actual desire 
to create mass casualties by design.  
The Oklahoma City bombing demonstrated that domestic terrorists are willing to 
create mass casualties. Even though the domestic threat has transitioned to issue groups 
who attack structures and buildings, these attacks are showing a pattern of increased 
lethality. The specter of chemical, nuclear, and biological attacks raises the risk of mass-
casualty incidents even higher.  
A current public-health concern is a pandemic influenza virus that infects an 
enormous number of patients, overwhelms the medical system, and creates severe 
shortages of available resources. Recent disasters, such as the Gulf hurricanes of 2004–
2005 and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, demonstrate how acts of nature can 
overwhelm a medical system. 
Our society has become increasingly dependent on a critical infrastructure that is 
aging and vulnerable to attack. Hospitals and medical system components are very 
dependent on water, power, supply distribution networks, and information technology, all 
of which can be compromised by an attack or natural disaster. The medical system itself 
is critical infrastructure that is very vulnerable and wrestling with the issue of open access 
to patients and protection measures.  
In today’s environment, the threat of a mass-casualty incident is real. While one 
may speculate on the specific likelihood of an incident, and talented, dedicated people are 
working tirelessly to prevent such an incident, the failure to develop innovative means to 
respond to such an incident would be a violation of the trust of the American people. The 
medical operations center is one such innovative approach that should be recognized and 
instituted throughout all the major metropolitan areas in the country. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, released October 18, 2007, 
establishes a national strategy for public health and medical preparedness. Besides 
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differentiating between the medical-system and public-health response activities 
mentioned above, the directive also contains key elements that support the establishment 
of medical operating centers. Under the background information the directive states, “The 
assumption that conventional public health and medical systems can function effectively 
in catastrophic events has, however, proved to be incorrect in real-world situations.” 22 
The directive follows with the statement that “the United States has tremendous resources 
in both public and private sectors that could be used to prepare for and respond to a 
catastrophic health event. To exploit those resources fully, they must be organized in a 
rationally designed system that is incorporated into pre-event planning, deployed in a 
coordinated manner in response to an event, and guided by a constant and timely flow of 
relevant information during an event.”23 The medical operations center can provide the 
needed coordination and timely flow of relevant information. The directive also points 
out, “Collectively, our Nation must develop a disaster medical capability that can 
immediately re-orient and coordinate existing resources within all sectors to satisfy the 
needs of the population during a catastrophic health event.”24 
While some may argue that the directive only applies to federal agencies, the 
actual medical care for individuals is provided at the local and regional level. Hence, the 
issues addressed in the directive apply to the local and regional level, and the medical 
operations center is one element of an effective disaster-relief medical system required by 
the directive. 
The current medical coordination system in many cities may prove ineffective. 
This traditional system usually involves coordinating medical and public-health response 
activities from one or two seats in an emergency operations center (EOC). This small 
component usually has to coordinate the activities of the EMS system, the local public-
health agency, the hospital system, and any other components of the medical system 
response. The hospital system alone can present enough challenges to overwhelm one or 
two people. Some individual facilities employ more personnel than all that jurisdiction’s 
                                                 




public-safety agencies combined. Coordinating the response activities of numerous large 
facilities, combined with public health, EMS, nursing homes, and physician clinics will 
take a dedicated and trained team instead of one or two individuals. The past system 
“worked” only because the medical system as a whole went uncoordinated. In today’s 
threat environment, that is no longer acceptable. 
Information is a critical component for any agency or organization responding to 
a large incident, and the medical system’s need is no different. In the past, components of 
the health-care system frequently operated in an information vacuum. They often acted as 
isolated islands, treated the patients as they arrived, and did the best they could with the 
resources available. Hospitals in particular need information from the scene in reference 
to the type of incident, the total number of patients, the type and severity of injury, and 
any patient contamination. Hospitals can often identify the class or nature of a chemical 
contaminant based upon patient symptoms, and they need a way to communicate those 
findings to the hazardous materials units working the scene. While there frequently is 
some form of information exchange between the EMS agency and the hospitals, that 
information is often spotty and unfocused. 
Hospitals need to understand the bigger picture in order to determine the impact 
of a disaster on the facility itself and to make operational adjustments. This problem is 
not unique to the United States. One of the key findings of a large chemical exercise held 
in Australia in 2003 was a need to “enhance communications with other emergency 
services and hospitals.”25  A review of the medical response to the London Subway 
bombings in July 2005 found that “all hospitals involved were reliant exclusively on 
media broadcasts and one-way communication from the scene via emergency services.”26 
Ensuring that resources are available is another critical component of any large-
scale medical response. The MOC can also serve a unique coordination role by collecting 
the various equipment and supply needs of the medical community. It can dispatch 
                                                 
25 Edwards et al., “Truth Hurts.” 
26 Lohn, Fong, and Whithey, “Medical perspective on mass casualty trauma,” 36–38. 
 13
resources from a cache, facilitate the transfer of loaned equipment, or communicate the 
needs to emergency management for procurement.  
Following the attack on the World Trade Center and the subsequent grounding of 
all aircraft, there was a concern that the hospital system might run short of supplies. 
Hospitals and other medical facilities keep a very low inventory level of supplies and 
depend on daily shipments of ordered equipment and consumables. The actions taken 
following 9/11 disrupted that supply chain. The Oklahoma City MERC communicated 
with hospitals and was able to find local sources in the medical system for some supply 
shortages encountered by several hospitals. 
In many circumstances, additional qualified and experienced health-care 
personnel respond to fill a need during a mass-casualty incident or public-health 
emergency. The medical system routinely runs at or near full capacity and is chronically 
short of personnel. A disaster exacerbates an already difficult situation. The additional 
patient load can readily overtax the already stressed health-care providers, who will need 
additional help in order to continue providing an acceptable level of care. Disaster leaders 
can find space and equipment, but it is far more difficult to locate additional personnel.  
There are potential sources for work force augmentation: Medical Reserve Corps 
personnel, state and federal agency personnel, private contractors, or, as in the case study 
presented at the start of this discussion, hospital personnel from an unaffected facility. 
The challenge will be to identify the personnel needs of the facility and match those 
needs with the supply of available personnel. This challenge will be even more difficult if 
the disaster scenario occurs where multiple facilities have staffing needs and are 
competing for the same workforce pool. The optimal way to prioritize and coordinate 
staffing augmentation is through a centralized coordinating entity such as the MOC. 
There may be other operational needs filled by a functioning and staffed medical 
operations center. The MOC may also serve as a call center for various medical-system 




as a patient distribution center to a central location for Medical Reserve Corps volunteer 
coordination. The type of incident and the particular challenges presented would dictate 
the specific role an MOC will play.  
In December 2007, Oklahoma City experienced an ice storm that resulted in more 
than one million people being without power. The Medical Emergency Response Center, 
the Oklahoma City MOC, activated to coordinate the needs of the hospitals and EMS.  
Surprisingly, the role of the MOC changed drastically during the initial days of 
the disaster. The hospital and EMS system were stressed but functioning without the need 
of much assistance. The real need turned out to be the individuals at home with medical 
devices such as O2 generators or nebulizers that needed power. The 211 center became 
flooded with calls from patients needing help; it transferred the calls to the MOC. For six 
days the MOC coordinated resources to get oxygen to the homebound, arranged EMS 
transport for those unable to stay in their homes, and assisted with the establishment of a 
special shelter for medical needs at the Cox Convention Center.27 
The MOC can also serve as a liaison to the federal and state agencies arriving in a 
city to render assistance. One of the most urgent needs for these agency personnel is 
situational awareness and mission coordination. A functioning MOC will be able to 
provide both. The MOC can also provide an upward flow of information to state and 
federal agency command centers to give a concise and timely picture of the current 
situation and the medical needs of the community. The centralized feature of MOC can 
provide a “one-stop” location for various agencies and teams requiring current medical 
system information. 
The MOC would not duplicate existing command and coordination centers. The 
intent of the MOC concept is to augment the existing response mechanism and provide a 
capability that has been missing in the past. The MOC actually expands the Emergency 
Operations Center by providing enough space to allow all the activities that are required  
 
                                                 
27 Author’s personal experience in responding to the December 2007 ice storm in Oklahoma City, 
December 8–19, 2008. 
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for a coordinated medical system response. In fact, the experience of the few MOC 
entities existing in the United States has demonstrated the benefits of being co-located 
with an existing EOC.  
Even though HSPD-21 clearly delineates the difference between medical system 
response and public-health response activities, the two do not have to be mutually 
exclusive. Many of the activities of both are similar, and the goal of a coordinated 
medical response translates eventually into the goal of a beneficial public-health 
response. The MOC and/or public-health EOC can actually include public-health 
response coordination as well as medical system coordination. An important element of 
success is the recognition that the medical system has different needs and response 
mechanisms from the traditional public-health system.  
Tracking patients from a disaster provides an example of a mutual benefit for both 
systems. The MOC can gather the names and locations of injured or ill patients in the 
health-care system. This information can greatly benefit public health in trying to locate 
contacts or those ill or exposed to a disease. Some medical facilities refuse to share 
patient information due to perceived HIPAA restrictions. The clear public-health activity 
exception provides a means to ease the concern and obtain information.  
The creation of a medical operation center will take coordination, buy-in, and 
funding. Although there will be an associated cost for training and equipment, the cost 
need not be prohibitive. The space for an MOC can be in an area that has other uses but 
would become available during an emergency. Staffing can be provided by trained 
personnel from large facilities that will have a vested interest in having one of their 
people working in the center. Administrative staff from the host organization can also be 
trained for a duty station in the MOC during an emergency.  
If a permanent and dedicated structure is desired, federal grant programs can be a 
potential source of funding. The FY 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program and the 
Health and Human Services Hospital Preparedness Program have at least eight grants that 
would allow the funding of a medical operations center. 
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There have been cases of the successful utilization of an MOC during an incident. 
During the Oklahoma City tornado in 2003, the MERC was able to present situational 
awareness to the ICS structure, which facilitated effective resource utilization. Shreveport 
created a spontaneous MOC in a classroom in 2005 to address the coordination needs of 
Katrina evacuees. Houston, likewise, established an MOC in its EOC to coordinate the 
medical care of the thousands of evacuees in the Astrodome. Houston also used the MOC 
to coordinate the needs of medically needy individuals during the hurricane Rita 
evacuations. The San Antonio MOC coordinated the movement of medical assets in 
preparation for the landfall of hurricane Dean in 2007. Both Tulsa and Oklahoma City 
utilized their respective MOCs to address the medical system needs of a crippling ice 
storm in December 2007.  
The after-action report on the hurricane Katrina response identified several 
failures in the medical response to the catastrophic storm that struck Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama. Hospital evacuation, medical volunteer coordination, mass 
fatality management, interoperable communications, and caring for special populations 
were some of the areas identified as needing improvement in the future.28 These were not 
failures of any particular facility or agency; they were system failures. An entity such as 
the MOC, which helps coordinate the medical system response, is a step that jurisdictions 
can take to avoid repeating the mistakes that occurred in 2005. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Since there is a relative paucity of literature addressing the concept of medical 
operations centers as a tool for coordinating the medical system during a disaster, this 
thesis will be an addition to the limited body of knowledge on the subject. The answer to 
the question at hand, and the possible additional questions answered, will provide either 
an argument against the option of medical operations centers or a collected body of 
evidence supporting their implementation. This thesis may also serve the purpose of 
                                                 
28 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, “A Summary of Four After-Action Reports on 
Hurricane Katrina.” 
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providing a certain degree of specificity to the generalized needs presented in other works 
that address the overall medical component to disaster response. 
This thesis may not answer all the questions surrounding the issue of medical 
system coordination and may call for additional research. It will provide a documented 
effort, background information, options considered, and specific research data on the 
issue. It will hopefully stimulate additional research to add depth, scope, and specificity 
to the subject matter.  
The thesis may provide a sound basis for the inclusion of the medical operations 
center as a necessary means of providing the needed coordination for an effective 
medical system response to a disaster. The network of centers proposed at the end of the 
thesis may provide a needed communications and coordination capability for the entire 
nation. Conversely, the thesis may provide a valid, academically based, and vetted source 
to eliminate the medical operations center concept as an option and allow future 
researchers a chance to refute, or accept the findings and move on to other options as a 
subject for research. 
The most important beneficiary of the research is the individual patient injured 
during a terrorist attack or other disaster. If the medical operations center proves a viable 
option and performs in a way that improves the overall medical system response, then 
that patient may benefit from rapid and appropriate care as well as a reduction in his or 
her risk of death. 
The individual medical system organizations may also benefit from the 
implementation of an effective means of receiving information, obtaining needed 
resources, and managing the individual impact of an incident. This may improve 
efficiency, reduce costs, and allow for the effective continuation of service by that 
organization. The overall community and response structure in place to address the 
incident would also benefit from the successful implementation of any mechanism 
proven to augment integration and coordination. There may be a heightened awareness of 
the need for coordination at the local level, and the challenges and solutions presented 
may save time and effort toward the actual implementation process. 
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The subject of the thesis will illuminate the present need to address a potential gap 
in the response capability of the medical system. The thesis also brings out and highlights 
a potential challenge in the difference between the medical system response and the 
public-health response, something not known to those outside the medical and public-
health disciplines. In the end, homeland security practitioners will have a viable option at 
their disposal to address a potential need in their community. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
Because the subject of the thesis topic treads on relatively new ground, I 
determined that there was a need to use several different research methods: a survey of 
various jurisdictions around the country, focus groups, interviews, and my own personal 
experience. The combination of the four methods has led to a body of evidence subject to 
analysis and available for further research. 
1. Survey 
The point of contact listed for each of the 124 jurisdictions with an established 
Metropolitan Medical Response System received a 28-question survey utilizing Survey 
Monkey. These point-of-contact individuals are responsible for the local medical-system 
response and would constitute a collective field of expertise on challenges to the medical 
system response. 
The survey questions included the following subjects: 
• Jurisdiction demographics and medical system size; 
• Current means of medical system coordination; 
• Opinions on the following topics: 
o The need for medical system coordination; 
o The adequacy of current mechanisms to address large mass-casualty 
incidents; 
o Utilizing a medical operations center as a means to facilitate the 
medical system response; 
o Potential challenges to the implementation of a center; 
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o Collaborative factors of implementation and integration; 
o The medical system as separate and different from the public-health 
system. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the survey respondents by the size of his or her 
jurisdiction. The population of the majority of jurisdictions was in the range of 100,000 to 
5,000,000. The MMRS Program uses population (starting with the largest U.S. city) to 
determine the location of the individual programs, so the jurisdictions surveyed will have 
a tendency to have a larger population. 
 











Table 2 shows an example of the different agency disciplines that currently house 
the MMRS program and are charged with medical-system response. The preponderance 
of fire departments likely stems from EMS and/or emergency management run by the fire 
department in the larger cities. The initial MMRS program created a Medical Strike 
Team—something more suited to the fire discipline. In cities with a separate emergency 
management agency, the MMRS Program likely landed in with other preparedness and 
mitigation programs run by that discipline. The wide variance of agencies means that any 
entity used for medical system coordination will need to involve significant collaboration 









Over 5,000,000 5.1% 
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Table 2.   Survey Respondent MMRS Housing Agency. 
 
2. Focus Groups 
Individuals from the following communities that currently have the makings of 
medical operations centers in place participated in focus group interviews during May 
and June 2008: 
• Houston; 
• San Antonio; 
• Oklahoma City. 
The focus group was interviewed on a variety of subjects:  
• Why was there a need for the center? 
• What instigated or initiated the creation of the center? 
• Is the system networked and adaptable to the point of not 
needing coordination? 
• What were some of the challenges faced? 
• How is the center operated and staffed? 
• How was the center funded? 
• What functions does the center perform? 
• What were some of the keys surrounding the successful collaboration? 
• What value has the center demonstrated if any? 
 Survey Respondent MMRS Housing Agency 
(61 Responding Agencies) 
Type of Agency No. Percent 
Fire Department 19 31.1% 
Emergency Management Agency 18 29.5% 
Public Health Department 8 13.1% 
EMS Agency 6 9.8% 
Homeland Security Agency 3 4.9% 
COG/Planning Commission 3 4.9% 
Hospital/Medical Association 2 3.3% 
Non-Government Organization 1 1.6% 
St. Louis STARRS 1 1.6% 
Police Department 0 0.0% 
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A qualitative analysis was performed on the transcript for each group in order to 
determine similarities and supportive evidence for the research questions. 
3. Interviews and Conversations 
More than 25 individual contacts with survey participants were required during 
the follow-through with the survey process. Many times these contacts evolved into 
lengthy conversations, particularly when a jurisdiction representative preferred not to 
complete the survey, but wanted to provide some input. The conversations are anecdotal, 
but provide some specific points used to provide support to the other research 
mechanisms. 
4. Personal Experience 
The author also brings personal experience to the research work. I have been 
involved in medical-system planning and integration for over ten years as the director of 
the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Medical Response System. I have direct disaster 
response experience as the Medical Branch Director for the Murrah bombing in 1995 and 
the tornado strikes in Oklahoma City in 1999 and 2003. I have also responded with the 
Oklahoma 1 D-MAT team to the 1998 ice storm in New York, to hurricane Ivan in 2004 
in Pensacola, and to the Superdome during hurricane Katrina in 2005. I have practical 
experience in trying to coordinate the medical system response from the back of a Ford 
Explorer. I coordinated the medical response to the May 3, 1999 tornado and later found 
that 85% of the patients from that incident self-referred to the hospital. While stationed at 
a special-needs shelter during hurricane Katrina, I participated in daily conference calls 
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II. THE CURRENT MEDICAL SYSTEM 
A. MEDICAL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
The definition or identification of which agencies, organizations, and businesses 
compose the medical system is essential for understanding their size, scope, function, and 
relationship with others. Current challenges to providing care assist in the determination 
of the need for a coordination entity such as a medical operations center. As mentioned 
earlier, one of the current working definitions of the medical system in HSPD-21 is given 
as those entities that provide the “science and practice of maintenance of health and 
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and alleviation of disease or injury and the provision of 
those services to individuals.”29 The Congressional Research Service document, The 
Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority and Funding, 
provides an additional description of the elements of the medical system: “A successful 
medical response is perhaps more complicated, requiring the coordination of several 
elements, which are variously based in federal, state, or local authority, or in the private 
sector. These elements are (1) patients, who may require rescue or medical evacuation; 
(2) a treatment facility, which may be an existing hospital or a field tent with cots; (3) a 
competent healthcare workforce; (4) appropriate medical equipment and non-perishable 
medical supplies; (5) appropriate drugs, vaccines, tests, and other perishable medical 
supplies; (6) a system of medical records; and (7) a healthcare financing mechanism.”30 
The three focus groups provided a list of the agencies and organizations they 
thought made up the medical system. The three groups all agreed that hospitals, EMS 
agencies, and long-term care facilities (LTC) were critical components of the medical 
system. Interestingly, all three groups also included public health, but not without a good 
deal of dissension among the various members of the group. Through additional 
discussions, each group identified numerous other agencies and organizations as 
                                                 
29 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21. 
30 Lister, The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters. 
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components of the medical system. Table 3 provides a list of the components of the 
medical system as determined by the focus group participants. 
 
Table 3.   Focus Group–Identified Medical System Components. 
FOCUS GROUP–IDENTIFIED MEDICAL SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Emergency Management Fire Departments Health Laboratories 
Rehabilitation Centers Military Clinics 
Specialty Hospitals Surgical Centers Medical Reserve Corps 
Physician Offices Professional Medical Societies Blood Banks 
Hospital Councils Non-governmental Agencies State and Federal Regulators 
Dialysis and other Technical 
Clinical Centers 
Regional Medical Councils Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
The various components offered by the focus groups are a matter of expert 
opinion. Even that opinion can fail to paint the total picture of the myriad of agencies and 
organizations, both private and public, that work together to provide medical care for the 
individual patient. The Oklahoma City focus group, for instance, was actually hesitant to 
list the agencies and organizations, arguing that their frequent experience with disasters 
has proven that what seem to be tangential parts of the system suddenly become either a 
critical need or an essential asset to address an evolving medical crisis. Despite the 
number and variance of medical system components, there are several key players that 
merit further discussion: hospitals, EMS, and long-term care facilities. 
1. Hospitals 
The hospital system in the United States is a collection of facilities, organizations, 
networks, and systems that operate in both the public and private sectors to provide 
definitive medical care to individuals. The hospital and its related care facilities are the 
initial destination for the severely ill and injured patient and provide the life-saving 
interventions that dictate the mortality and morbidity of any particular incident. Since 
saving lives and reducing the extent of injury are the highest priorities for any disaster 
response, hospitals occupy an extremely important position in relation to all the agencies 
and organizations responsible for mitigating the effects of a natural disaster or terrorist 
attack. 
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There are 5,708 hospitals in the United States. Over 85% (4,897) of these are non-
federal, short-term general, or specialty facilities known as community hospitals. 
Community hospitals can be further broken down into not-for-profit (2,913 or 59%), 
investor owned for-profit (873 or 18%), and state and local government–owned (1,111 or 
23%).31 There are 213 federal hospitals, 444 psychiatric hospitals, 136 long-term care 
hospitals, and 18 institutional facilities.32 
There are 945,199 total staffed hospitals beds in the United States, of which 
800,892 (85%) are found in community hospitals. Smaller rural hospitals make up 41% 
(1,997) of the community hospitals while larger and more capable hospitals located in the 
urban areas make up 59% (2,900) of the total. Hospital admissions exceeded 37 million 
patients last year, and the total expenses for hospitals exceed 640 billion dollars.33 
Rural facilities tend to be smaller with fewer total beds and limited capabilities. 
They frequently refer patients needing advanced care to the larger facilities in 
metropolitan areas.  
Of the MMRS jurisdictions that responded to the survey, nearly 70% had at least 
six acute-care hospitals in their jurisdiction. Over 26% of the responding jurisdictions had 
more than fifteen acute-care hospitals in their metropolitan area. Over 26% of the MMRS 
respondents also had more than five non-acute specialty hospitals in their respective 
jurisdictions.34 
2. Emergency Medical Services 
Like the hospital system in the United States, the Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS) discipline is comprised of numerous types of agencies and organizations that 
deliver emergency pre-hospital care to the victims of a disaster or public-health 
emergency. The role of EMS can prove a significant factor in the overall successful 
                                                 
31 American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on Hospitals.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Survey results available from author. 
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mitigation of a patient’s injuries and/or illness. While the definitive care for a patient 
usually occurs at a hospital, the EMS provider performs critical lifesaving interventions, 
rapid transport, and perhaps most importantly, the distribution of the patient to a facility 
capable of meeting the patient’s needs. 
There are different levels of clinical licensure for EMS services and units. These 
licensure levels reflect either the level of clinical practice performed by the patient 
attendant, or a specialty capability dictated by the type of transport. Each state dictates 
the level of service and the clinical care provided; hence, there is a wide array of different 
types of services throughout the county. At the federal level, the typing determined by the 
benefit payer, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) helps illustrate 
the different types of EMS services and units.35  
Table 4 shows the different CMS definitions for the providers of EMS services. 
EMS involves both public agencies and private corporations. The clinical licensure level 
varies from a basic emergency medical technician (EMT-B) to a registered nurse (RN) 
and occasionally, a physician. The vehicles used for transport and response go far beyond 
the traditional ambulance and include everything from small chase cars to fixed-wing 
aircraft. The EMS service in the nation is large and quite varied. 
There are 15,276 ambulance services in the United States. There are 48,384 
ground ambulance vehicles and 840,669 licensed EMS personnel. Fire departments make 
up 42% of EMS providers. Government service providers outside of the fire department 
make up 25% of EMS providers. Hospital-based and private companies constitute 20% of 
providers, while other types (tribal, police) make up the remaining 13% of EMS 
services.36 
The EMS services that provide only non-emergency transport may not figure into 
the daily EMS emergency response, but they do facilitate a significant number of patient 
transfers. They are a resource during a disaster or public-health emergency to assist with 
                                                 
35 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual. 
36 National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, EMS Fast Facts. 
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the emergency call volume. Many metropolitan areas also have multiple emergency and 
non-emergency EMS services working within the same jurisdiction or region.  
 
Table 4.   CMS Definitions of EMS Providers. 
CMS Definitions of EMS Providers 
EMS Service Category Category Determinants 
Basic Life Support (BLS) non-emergency Patient ground transportation staffed by an individual 
licensed at the Emergency Medical Technician-Basic 
(EMT-B) level. Units do not respond to emergency calls. 
Basic Life Support (BLS) emergency Patient ground transportation staffed by an individual 
licensed at the EMT-B level who responds to emergency 
calls and may provide non-emergency transport. 
Advanced Life Support (ALS) non-
emergency 
Patient ground transportation staffed by an individual 
licensed at the Emergency Medical Technician–
Intermediate (EMT-I) level or an Emergency Medical 
Technician Paramedic (EMT-P). Units do not respond to 
emergency calls. 
Advanced Life Support (ALS) emergency Emergency response patient ground transportation staffed 
by an EMT-I or EMT-P. Units may also provide non-
emergency transport. 
Advanced Life Support (ALS) level 2 An ALS unit that provides three or more medications to a 
patient or at least one specialized intervention. 
Specialty Care Transport (SCT) Interfacility ground transportation of a patient requiring 
care beyond the scope of the EMT-P licensure. 
Paramedic Intercept (PI) Units that provide ALS services without providing 
transportation. Transportation usually provided by BLS 
services. 
Fixed-Wing Ambulance (FW) Patient air transport provided by an FAA-licensed airplane 
ambulance. 
Rotary-Wing Ambulance Patient air transport provided by FAA-licensed helicopter 
ambulance. 
 
Of the 69 MMRS cities that responded to the EMS question on the survey, 82.6% 
had two or more emergency 911 services operating in their region. Over 26% of the 
jurisdictions had more than 15 emergency services operating within one region. The same 
pattern held true with non-emergency EMS services. Over 82% of the cities surveyed had 
two or more in their area and over 30% had more than six non-emergency providers in 
their jurisdiction. Coordination of this many EMS organizations would be difficult from 




3. Long-Term Care Facilities 
Long-term care facilities provide medical and non-medical care to individuals 
with chronic illness or disability and are part of a continuum of services that include adult 
day services, home health care, community services, senior housing, assisted-living 
residences, continuing-care retirement communities, and nursing homes. The vast 
majority of the residents of these facilities are elderly and in various stages of physical, 
mental, and behavioral incapacitation. The nature of the incapacities makes this 
population extremely vulnerable and more reliant on on-site caregivers and the mostly 
privatized facility owners and operators. The frailty, lack of mobility, and congregate 
housing of this population also produce significant challenges for response personnel 
during an emergency—such as a fire or flood—requiring evacuation. 
The number of long-term facilities in the United States is large, and the number 
will grow. By 2026, the population of Americans aged 65 and older will double to 71.5 
million. Between 2007 and 2025, the number of Americans ages 85 and older will 
increase by 40%. Among people turning 65 today, 69% will need some form of long-term 
care, whether in the community or in a residential care facility37. 
There are 16,100 certified nursing homes in the United States, with a total 
resident population of 1.4 million. There are 39,500 assisted-living facilities in the 
country, with a population of 900,000.38 
Nearly 1.4 million elderly individuals receive some type of home health 
services.39 Interrupted service due to a disaster or a weather emergency creates an 
additional strain on the EMS agencies and hospitals. Home health patients utilize the 911 
system in order to obtain the medical care they are now missing. 
The long-term facilities in the United States are also seeing “an influx of patients 
seeking short-term rehabilitative care as cash-strapped hospitals treat and discharge 
                                                 




patients as quickly as possible.”40 Many nursing homes are reducing the longer-term beds 
in order to meet this new and more profitable demand.41 This will have the effect of 
reducing the number of overall beds for the long-term patients as well as adding a 
different demographic mix into the current long-term care system. 
Sixty-four MMRS cities responded to the survey question asking about the 
number of nursing homes in their jurisdiction. Slightly less than 82% of the jurisdictions 
had more than six long-term care facilities in their area. The largest percentage of 
respondents, 32% (21), had between 26 and 50 facilities. Four jurisdictions (6.1%) had 
between 151 and 200 long-term care facilities in their response area. The long-term care 
facilities in many cities are numerous, growing, and present significant coordination and 
response challenges. 
4. The Physician Community 
Independently practicing physicians constitute another major element of the 
medical system in the United States. While many are affiliated with and practice in the 
hospital system, individual patients receive a significant amount of care in the physicians’ 
offices and clinics that dot the landscape of every American city and town. There are two 
main groups of medical practitioners in the United States: allopathic (M.D.) and 
osteopathic (D.O.). Although these two groups have become very similar in recent 
decades, there are still some subtle differences in their approaches to a patient. M.D.s and 
D.O.s receive their education and training in different medical school programs and 
belong to different professional organizations. 
Collectively, they number 940,000 physicians, including 62,000 osteopathic 
physicians, and 223,000 graduates of foreign medical schools who meet the U.S. license 
credentialing standards.42 In 2006 there were over 900 million office visits in the United 
States,43 roughly three visits for each man, woman, and child in our country. 
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The physician community outside of hospitals is large, geographically extensive, 
and carries a significant load of the medical care performed in the United States. Any 
reduction in that load, such as during weekends and holidays, reverberates through the 
acute-care hospitals as patients seek out care for what they perceive as urgent medical 
problems. During a long-term disaster, or public-health emergency, it is important to 
keep the physician community engaged and informed so they can continue to carry the 
load of primary and specialized care.  
5. Other Medical-System Components 
There are numerous other medical system components beyond the key ones just 
discussed or identified by the focus groups. Some of these include pharmacies, mental-
health-care providers, medical suppliers, rehabilitation centers, dialysis units, and home-
health-care agencies. The list can be continued with additional agencies, organizations 
and businesses—each with its unique contribution to medical care and each with its 
unique role in preparedness and emergency response. Perhaps the Oklahoma City focus 
group was correct in its hesitation to list components, because a disaster will frequently 
identify someone not on the list. The recent focus on addressing the needs of the medical 
special-needs population has added additional entities to the medical-response equation. 
During the 2007 ice storm in Oklahoma City, the local medical operations center 
activated to monitor the EMS agencies’ difficulty with call volume and hazardous streets 
as well as the hospital system’s increase in ED call volume. Both those systems were 
coping well, but when the power to the city was lost, suddenly the MOC was addressing 
homebound medical patients, dialysis units without power and clean water, and a large 
shelter operation requiring medical volunteer staffing, medical case management, and 
pharmaceutical support. During the Oklahoma City bombing, a group of massage 
therapists offered their assistance to the U.S.A.R. workers returning from a hard shift on 
the rubble pile. The therapists were approved, and command incorporated them into the 
incident command structure. Where were they placed? Under the medical branch, their 
services deemed a clinical support to their clients.  
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From ICU beds to nursing homes, to massage therapists, the number and variation 
of agencies and organizations that can potentially be needed to mitigate, respond to, or 
recover from a large mass-casualty incident is vast. There will need to be a mechanism to 
coordinate their collective response activities and resources in order to optimize their 
capabilities; this is a mechanism that may or may not be in place. 
B. THE MEDICAL SYSTEM AS A NETWORK 
One argument against the need for a medical coordination center is the fact that 
the medical system is actually a network that will adapt to a changing situation and self-
correct any deficiencies. The idea that the medical system is a complex adaptive system 
is not new; the term “network” routinely winds its way through the medical system 
lexicon. A medical-care system often advertises the advantage of being part of a greater 
network of medical-care providers. Insurance companies have networks of physicians. 
The medical system has demonstrated its capability to change to variations in its internal 
and external environment. The medical world is constantly changing with new 
knowledge evolving from practical experience and research. As new knowledge comes in 
from this evidence-based process, the medical system modifies its practices, processes, 
and procedures to reflect the new knowledge. The converse is true also; if the evidence 
shows that it is better not to do something, the system will eventually eliminate that item 
from all practices.  
Perhaps the best example of adaptation in the medical system revolves around the 
issue of reimbursement. A major source of payment for the medical system is Medicare 
administered by CMS. When CMS makes changes in the reimbursement structure that 
provides what is determined to be favorable funding, the medical system will shift to 
offer more of those services. Currently the care for cardiac patients and those suffering 
from stroke has a high priority with CMS and consequently has favorable reimbursement 
rate. That is partially the reason why most medical systems are now emphasizing cardiac 
and stroke care. Pulmonary problems do not have the current attention of CMS and 
therefore are not as profitable for the medical system. That helps explain the plethora of 
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cardiac and stroke advertising and the building of specialized cardiac and neurological 
hospitals, while specialized pulmonary hospitals are rare or nonexistent.  
Potential negative consequences will also create adaptation. CMS recently ruled 
that it would not pay for care to a pneumonia patient who did not receive antibiotics 
within four hours of arrival. Now many emergency departments have a “quality 
assurance” program that tracks and monitors the time between patient arrival and 
medication administration. 
So, if the medical system is a network and the network can adapt to change, then 
why would there be a potential need for a coordination center? I asked the three focus 
groups that specific question. All three groups unanimously felt that the health-care 
system was indeed a network. All three also felt that the system was capable of adapting 
to the external environment. All three also felt that the adaptation would be too slow and 
that there was a need for a coordination entity.  
The Houston group felt that the adaptation would occur but that it would be slow 
and uncoordinated, which would preclude the system from making the best use of 
resources. Feeling as if they were on their own, the Houston hospitals would not have a 
central location to go for help, and patients might not be placed appropriately based upon 
their needs.44  
The San Antonio group also felt that the system is able to adapt in certain 
circumstances based upon the variables of location, the number of casualties, and the 
scope of the incident. During a large incident, however, a coordination entity would be 
needed to facilitate that adaptation.45  
The Oklahoma City group agreed that the medical system can adapt—that had 
been demonstrated in the past. 46 Oklahoma City felt that it was a matter of how fast and 
how well that adaptation occurred. They felt the need for a coordination entity to improve 
the speed and efficiency of the adaptation. The Oklahoma City group also pointed out the 
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sheer number of facilities that needed to communicate and the recent JCAHO 
requirement for facilities to be self-sufficient for the first ninety-six hours of an incident 
as a reason for a coordination entity. 47 
C. MEDICAL SYSTEM CHALLENGES 
Anyone who has recently listened to the news or heard a politician speak 
understands that the medical system in the United States faces some significant 
challenges. While a comprehensive examination of all the challenges facing the medical 
system is beyond the scope of this paper, the reader needs to be aware of some of the 
more significant problems that will affect an emergency response. Some of these 
problems include an aging population requiring more services, significant financial 
impacts, privatization and specialty hospitals, a lack of surge capacity in the nations’ 
emergency departments, and a very troubled EMS system. 
As mentioned earlier in my discussion of long-term care facilities, the population 
of America is aging. There is good news: the financial circumstances, overall health, 
level of disability, and educational level of the baby boomer is markedly improved 
compared to the 65-year-old population of twenty or thirty years ago.48 Still, this 
movement of the bell curve will require more aging services such as long-term care and 
geriatric medical specialists. This demographic change will also have a profound effect 
on the financial status of the health-care system as more and more individuals become 
eligible for Medicare or require the assistance of Medicaid. 
The financial makeup of the medical system is a confusing mixture of government 
payers (Medicare and Medicaid), third-party payers (insurance companies), non-profits, 
for-profits, cost-shifting, private specialty facilities, and foundations. There is also a large 
segment of the population that lacks any means of paying for the expensive costs of 
health care other than out-of-pocket payment. A look at some hospital statistics will 
illuminate the financial woes experienced by all medical providers attempting to collect 
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payment for services rendered. One-third of hospitals lose money on operations.49 
Hospital operating margins average 4%.50 Medicare and Medicaid represent 55% of the 
care provided by hospitals, yet Medicare only pays 91 cents for each dollar spent, and 
Medicaid only pays 86 cents for each dollar spent caring for a patient.51 In 2006 hospitals 
provided care to people in financial need at a cost of over $31 billion of care for which no 
payment was received.52 The Medicare shortfall for hospital care exceeds $18 billion, 
and the Medicaid funding shortfall exceeds $11 billion.53 The lack of recovered costs 
forces hospitals to shift that cost onto other insurers or make cutbacks that affect the 
entire community. These cutbacks and the overall financial frailty of the medical system 
create a very fragile system that is expected to respond to a mass-casualty incident from a 
natural disaster or terrorist event.  
A relatively new phenomenon is occurring in the hospital system today, 
particularly in states where the government no longer regulates the number or type of 
hospitals through a certificate of need process: the single-specialty, investor-owned 
hospital or surgery center. Physicians often own part of these facilities and refer their 
own patients to these facilities. The net result is a powerful direct competitive force 
against the large community acute-care hospitals offering trauma services to victims of 
natural disasters or terrorist incidents.54  
Physician specialists, such as surgeons, are operating their own facility for their 
own patients. They no longer have to provide trauma call coverage for the community 
hospital in return for a location that has the equipment and space for them to practice; 
they have their own. They are also able to provide their specialty service only for those 
patients who are capable of paying either through insurance or out of their own pockets. 
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A large terrorist explosion or significant natural disaster will likely produce scores 
of trauma patients. These patients will receive numerous different injuries affecting 
different body systems and will require numerous specialists rapidly working at the same 
time in order to save the patient’s life. A patient may have a closed head injury needing a 
neurosurgeon, a chest injury needing a thoracic surgeon, multiple leg fractures needing an 
orthopedic surgeon, and burns needing a plastic surgeon. The trauma system in the 
United States operates on the premise that all of these specialists have to be physically 
located at the same facility or rapidly respond when called. With specialists operating out 
of their own facilities, there is no incentive to take call. In fact, there are disincentives 
present, such as loss of revenue and potential lawsuits. In some communities, hospitals 
pay upwards of $15,000 in call pay a night to ensure that the right specialists will arrive 
when needed.  
Other systems have cobbled together a system of hospital trauma rotation and 
staffed call centers to direct trauma patients to the hospital that is providing services for 
that day. This adds additional costs into the trauma and medical systems. The sporadic 
and uncertain nature of today’s trauma systems creates an environment where EMS needs 
real-time information on a hospital’s capabilities to ensure that the patient is delivered to 
a facility that has the available specialists to meet the patient’s needs. 
Many of today’s hospitals in general, and emergency departments in particular, 
lack any type of real surge capacity to meet the patient load demands that would be 
placed on them during a mass-casualty incident. In fact, handling the daily emergency 
patient volume often overwhelms the nation’s emergency departments. In 2007, 65% of 
urban hospitals and 47% of all hospitals reported that their emergency departments were 
over capacity. Diversions, at times when the hospital cannot accept additional patients by 
ambulance, were reported by 56% of urban hospitals.55 In 2003 U.S. hospitals diverted 
more than 500,000 ambulances—an average of one per minute.56  
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Table 5, from the American Hospital Association, demonstrates that emergency 
department capacity is an issue regardless of the type of facility considered. Our teaching 
hospitals, which tend to have additional staff in the form of residents and students, are 
either at or over capacity nearly 75% of the time.  The urban hospitals in this nation, 
usually an end destination for many rural acute patients, fared little better at 65%. 
Overall, hospital emergency departments reach or exceed capacity nearly 50% of the 
time. Based upon these statistics, there is a 50–50 chance that a hospital emergency 
department will already have capacity issues when a disaster occurs. The coordination of 
patient destination and resources, in light of the capacity issue, becomes critical.  
 
Table 5.   Percentage of Either “At Capacity” or “Over Capacity” by Hospital Type. 
 
The capacity and volume challenges to the nation’s emergency departments are 
not getting any better. Each year the situation seems to get worse. Despite efforts on the 
part of the hospitals to mitigate the challenge, there seems to be an increase in divert 
hours for the emergency departments. Table 6 provides a graphic demonstration of one of 
the main reasons that the nation’s emergency departments are continually experiencing 
long wait times, closures, and patient diverts.  As the table shows, the number of patients 
seeking care in an emergency department is steadily on the increase, while the actual 
number of emergency departments available to provide that care is steadily decreasing. 
This decrease in available emergency departments is due to hospital closures or the 
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conversion of former community hospitals with an emergency department to another type 
of specialty-care facility that no longer offers emergency services to the community. 
The situation throughout the rest of the hospital system is not much better. 
Financial challenges and cost containment have forced hospitals to close units and/or 
switch resources over to more profitable care modalities. The current shortage of an 
estimated 116,000 registered nurses has also forced hospital to reduce available beds 
simply due to the lack of available staff. 57 
 
Table 6.   Number of ED Visits/Year, Number of Emergency Departments/Year. 
 
The EMS system in the United States is not faring much better. Recent changes in 
the amount that Medicare will pay for an ambulance transport has resulted in many rural 
services not being able to meet their costs of providing service. These services either find 
a subsidy, combine with a fire service, or close their doors. Since the changes went into 
effect, at least fifty ambulance services have closed in Oklahoma.58 Even though there 
has been a 20-year progression of placing the EMS discipline within the fire service, and 
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fire departments are the lead EMS agencies in most large metropolitan areas, many fire 
departments do not focus on evidence-based medicine, outcomes, and cost effectiveness.  
Many of the same problems that were present in 1985 are still present today.59 
These problems include the shuttering of EMS services, overutilization of the service for 
non-emergency calls, sleep-deprived EMS crews, long patient wait times, and an entire 
field of emergency workers who lack the training to deal with a large-scale catastrophe.60  
These problems have many origins: lack of a clear federal agency for EMS, lack 
of state constitutional mandates that are found for fire and law enforcement, low pay, 
increased call volume, and lack of financial support.61 
D. AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COORDINATION 
One of the questions surrounding the issue of medical system coordination is 
“which agency(s) has the legal authority/responsibility for coordinating a medical 
response?” The answer to that question differs depending on the level of government 
queried. Legislation and presidential directives provided after hurricane Katrina clearly 
define the federal authorities. In December of 2006, the president signed P.L. 109–417, 
the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, which provided that “The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall lead all federal public health and medical response to 
public-health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan”62  
State and local governments, rather than the federal government, are the seats of 
responsibility and authority for public-health activities, both in general and in response to 
public-health and medical emergencies.63 At the state level, legislative mandate and 
regulatory responsibility has usually placed the legal authority and responsibility with the 
state departments of health. What is far less clear is the responsibility at the local and  
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regional level. At this level, regulatory activities are frequently absent and defer to state 
regulation. Numerous city, county, and regional agencies potentially could assume 
responsibility for medical system coordination. 
In order to get an idea of which of these agencies has responsibility and authority, 
I asked this specific question in the MMRS survey: “At the local and regional level, 
which agency has the legal authority/responsibility for coordinating a medical response 
(EMS, Hospital, Long-Term Care, and Physician Offices)?” Seventy MMRS Directors 
representing medical health and preparedness coordination in cities and jurisdictions 
around the county responded with the results summarized in the following Table 7. 
 
Table 7.   Local Jurisdiction and Regional Agencies with Authority/Responsibility for 
Medical Response Coordination. 
Local Jurisdiction and Regional Agencies with 
Authority/Responsibility for Medical Response Coordination 
Response Number Percentage 
Public Health 20 28.2% 
EMS 17 23.9% 
Fire 16 22.5% 
Other 8 11.3% 
No Agency Clearly 
Identified 
7 9.9% 
Don’t Know 3 4.2% 
Total Responses 70  
 
The results appear to demonstrate that the perceived or actual authorities cross a 
spectrum of different agencies depending on the jurisdiction. There is no consistent 
agency at the local level that has the authority, and over 10% of the respondents either 
did not know, or had no agency clearly identified with that responsibility. 
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E. CURRENT MEANS OF COORDINATION 
There is little, if any, published information that adequately describes just how 
medical system coordination occurs at the local level around the nation. The survey was 
an attempt to ascertain at least enough actual information from enough jurisdictions to get 
a semblance of how medical coordination occurs around the country. A series of survey 
questions posed to the 124 MMRS jurisdictions was designed to gather data on just how 
many different ways coordination took place in the major metropolitan areas. The 
number of responses varies depending on the questions asked and the applicability of the 
question to the respondent’s jurisdiction. Because the concept of a dedicated MOC is 
relatively new, there may also be some degree of confusion with the terms presented in 
the questions, and there may be some inconsistency between questions. Still, the data 
collected proved useful to demonstrate the multitude of ways in which the medical 
system is coordinated during a response. 
The first substantive survey question asked simply where the coordination took 
place: 
Table 8.   Local Medical Response Element Coordination.  
 
How is the coordination of the local and medical response elements (focused on 
individual care i.e., EMS, hospitals, and long-term care facilities) coordinated? 
Coordination Location Percentage No.
Don’t Know-Not Sure 1.6% 1 
Not Coordinated 0.0% 0 
Coordinated solely the ICS in the field 4.9% 3 
Generally identified seats in an EOC 31.1% 19 
Specifically identified medical operations center seats in an EOC 9.8% 6 
Specifically identified public health operations centers seats in an 
EOC 
1.6% 1 
Specifically identified combined public health/medical operations 
center seats in an EOC 
16.4% 10 
Separate and distinctly identified medical operations enter seats in an 
EOC 
1.6% 1 
Separate and distinctly identified public health operations center co-
located with EOC 
0.0% 0 
Separate and distinctly identified combined medical and public health 
operations center collocated with EOC 
9.8% 6 
Separate and distinctly identified medical operations center located 6.6% 4 
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away from EOC 
Separate and distinctly indentified public health operations center 
located away from EOC 
1.6% 1 
Separate and distinctly identified combined medical and public health 
operations center located away from EOC 
9.8% 6 
Other Locations: 4.9% 3 
Total Number of Respondents:  61 
 
More than 70% of the jurisdictions stated that the coordination took place in the 
local EOC. Three jurisdictions (5%) coordinate the medical system from out in the field. 
Less than half of the jurisdictions (44%) utilizing an EOC identified those seats as 
“general.” The remaining number of jurisdictions coordinating in an EOC answered with 
variations of separate and distinctly identified seats.  
The possible confusion over the term “general seats” becomes apparent with the 
results of the next two questions. When asked about the number of general seats used, 
more than the original 44% responded (Table 9). 
 
Table 9.   Number of Medical System Seats in Local EOC. 
 
If the medical system response is coordinated through general ESF-8 
seats in an EOC, how many seats are dedicated to personnel tasked with 
that mission? 
Answer Options No. of Jurisdictions Percentage 
Doesn’t apply to my jurisdiction 18 30.5% 
0 1 1.7% 
1 7 11.9% 
2-4 25 42.4% 
5-7 3 5.1% 
Over 7 5 8.5% 
Total Responses  59 
 
Once again, when asked whether they felt the number of general seats was 
adequate, the number of responses exceeded the initial 44. This could be the result of 
confusion about the term general or misreading the question and answering based upon 
the number of seats regardless of their identification. 
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Although inconsistent, the responses to the three questions provide some useful 
information about medical system coordination. Regardless of the nomenclature attached 
to the seats, over 80% of the jurisdictions using an EOC to coordinate a medical response 
have four or fewer seats dedicated to that purpose.  
The results still can give an idea of the perception of adequacy for the current 
means of coordinating a medical response. Of those responding, 40% felt that the current 
means would be adequate for all incidents. The remaining 60% felt that current means 
would work for a small to moderate incident, but not for a large incident (50%) or would 
not work for most, if any incidents (7.5%). One respondent felt that the current system in 
his or her jurisdiction was not adequate for any incident. 
 
Table 10.   Respondent Opinion on Adequacy of Number of EOC Seats. 
 
 
For the jurisdictions that had adopted some means of a separate off-site medical-
system coordinating mechanism, I wanted to find out which agency or organization was 
the primary operator of the center and where the center was physically located to see if 
there were any consistencies with the spontaneous development of the relatively new 
modified means of coordination. Both questions were asked on the survey. The results of 
the thirty-six agencies that responded to the question about the lead agency clearly show  
 
If the medical system response is coordinated though general ESF-8 seats in an EOC, do 
you feel that the number of dedicated seats is adequate to coordinate the medical system 
response during a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or public health emergency that either 
compromises the medical system or creates a large number of injured/ill? 
Response Option Number of 
Jurisdictions 
Percentage
Doesn’t apply to my jurisdiction 21 34.4% 
Yes, for small/moderate incidents, no for larger 
incidents 
20 32.8% 
Yes for all incidents 16 26.2% 
No for most, if not all, incidents 3 4.9% 
No for all incidents 1 1.6% 
Total Response  61 
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that medical system operations centers are located in a wide array of different agencies. 
As may be expected, the locations of the different operations centers were also spread out 
among numerous organizations and agencies. 
 
Table 11.   Primary Agency Operating Separate Medical Operations Center. 
 
If your MMRS jurisdiction utilizes a separate medical systems operations center to 
coordinate the medical system, which agency or organization is the primary operator of 
the center? 
Response Options Number of 
Jurisdictions 
Percentage 
Does not apply to my jurisdiction 26 41.9% 
Emergency management Agency 3 4.8% 
EMS Agency 6 9.7% 
Local Public Health Agency 7 11.3% 
Fire Department 3 4.8% 
Local Homeland Security Agency 0 0.0% 
Hospital Association or Council 2 3.2% 
Individual Hospital 1 1.6% 
Trauma or Medical Coordination Group 4 6.5% 
Medical Consortioum/501C3 1 1.6% 
State Health department 4 6.5% 
Other 5 8.1% 
Total Responses  62 
 
Table 12.   Location of Medical Operations Center If Away from an EOC. 
 
If your jurisdiction’s local/regional disaster medical system coordinating center is located 
away from an EOC, where is it located? 
Respondent Options No. of Jurisdictions Percentage 
Doesn’t apply to my jurisdiction 34 57.6% 
Public Health Agency 11 18.6% 
Hospital(s) 1 1.7% 
Separate Trauma/Medical Coordinating Center 1 1.7% 
Public Safety Dispatch Center 0 0.0% 
Public Safety Agency 2 3.4% 
Professional Association 0 0.0% 
Other: 10 16.9% 
Collocated with Public Health Operations              
Center 
(1)  
 Regional Coordinating Hospital (1)  
 Seat located in EOC or collocated in EOC (3)  
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 Stand alone facility (1)  
 On EMS property or within EMS agency (3)  
 Still in development stages—no location yet (1)  
Total Responses  59 
F. ANALYSIS 
The good news is that even after all the information presented in this chapter, 
most Americans have access to some of the finest medical care in the world. This high 
level of care may be part of the problem; it is unknown how much longer the United 
States can afford to sustain the costs of such care, and there seems to be an ever-
increasing number of individuals that can no longer afford the health insurance needed to 
pay for care. Consequently, cost containment efforts are affecting surge capabilities, and 
the uninsured are seeking more care for less acute illness and injury at the default 
provider—the emergency department. These factors, combined with the potential future 
demands placed on the system by an aging population are creating increasing daily 
stressors on the medical system, which does not bode well for the medical system’s 
capability to respond to a future mass-casualty incident or catastrophic event. 
The sheer number of public agencies, organizations, businesses, non-
governmental agencies, and health-care providers that constitute the medical system is so 
vast that coordination of the activities will be a challenge in the best of circumstances. It 
is significant that employees who work in the system struggled to name all the 
components of the system in the focus groups. One group gave up after a short while 
acknowledging that the task was impossible—some unknown element would surely be 
left off the list.  
The system elements provided by the groups also included many non-medical 
agencies—descriptive of the reach, depth, and interdependency of the medical system 
with its response partners. The medical system appears as a many-armed hydra with its 
tentacles intricately interlaced with other health-care providers and outside agencies. The 
system defies description beyond the functionality of providing individual medical care. 
As anyone who has tried to work his way through the system as a patient will tell you, 
access to resources and care can be multifaceted and at times bewildering. Yet it is this 
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system, during a mass-casualty incident, that we depend upon to maximize its resources 
to save our lives, bind our wounds, and return us back to a post-incident world as whole 
as possible. 
The discussion demonstrated both the scope and complexity of the some of the 
better-known elements of the medical system. The flagships of the system, the large acute 
care hospitals, often represent a small and privatized microcosm of the community 
surrounding them. Each facility not only offers medical care, but also transportation, fast 
food, coffee shops, art, and shopping. Some facilities even have hotels built into their 
structures. One of these often is large enough to present significant coordination 
challenges, yet the majority of metropolitan areas have numerous facilities both large and 
small as either a non-specific acute-care facility, or a provider of highly focused and 
specialized care.  
The EMS system in the country is highly fragmented and found in multiple 
organizational structures, both public and private. Long-term care facilities, taking care of 
our most vulnerable population, will continue to grow in both number of beds needed and 
specialized services offered. The physician community and other components of the health-
care system will likely remain an increasing large and complex group of niche service 
providers that will constantly evolve in reaction to regulations, technological advances, and 
market forces. Based on sheer number and complexity, the system needs an effective 
coordinating mechanism that understands the system and can escalate to meet response needs 
during a large mass-casualty incident or catastrophic event. 
Several factors prevent the medical system network from spontaneously adapting 
to a mass casualty without some sort of coordination. These factors include the imperfect 
nature of the network, time, and community expectations. The medical system is actually 
a network of networks that integrate both vertically and horizontally. Between each 
network, there is a potential delay or stopping point as one network has its needs met and 
has no stake in making sure that the rest of the network changes. Even though all of the 
network would eventually adapt to the significant change in the external environment, 
that adaptation would occur much too slowly and result in needless loss of life.  
The community expects its government, at all levels, to take active steps to 
mitigate any disaster. The government has responded by instituting command, control, 
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and coordination mechanisms such as emergency operations centers and the Incident 
Command System. The community also expects effective and active coordination of the 
medical system. 
The challenges faced by the medical system are real and far-reaching. They create 
a current environment where the medical system may not be able to live up to the 
expectations of the community or even of those responsible for overseeing a response. A 
disaster is not the time to discover these challenges. The challenges need to be 
acknowledged and mitigated both before an incident through planning and during an 
incident through an effective coordination of resources and information. 
The authority and responsibility for coordination of the medical system response 
is an important first step in determining the agency that should be doing the coordination 
and the effectiveness of the current methods. It is not surprising that most of the 
authorities are found in EMS and public health since those are the predominate agencies 
given ESF-8 responsibility in local emergency operation plans. The relatively high 
percentage of fire departments having the authority may be a reflection of the relatively 
large number of fire departments administering the MMRS program (the survey 
respondent source) or the respondent’s assumption that coordination takes place in the 
field, where fire departments usually are the lead agency. Unfortunately, the survey did 
not drill down to identify the “other” category, which may have added additional players. 
The large number of unknown or no agency clearly identified (14%), if extrapolated to a 
national level, would show an alarming number of jurisdictions who either have not 
addressed the issue, or are dependent on state agencies to provide the coordination. 
The assessment of the current means of coordination was partially successful at 
best. Most of the medical system coordination is still done through seats in an emergency 
operations center (EOC) with four or fewer positions to manage the medical system 
during an incident. A number of jurisdictions have taken the step of moving the medical 
system coordination out of the EOC and into another entity.  
A significant statistic is the fact that 60% of the jurisdictions that still use a small 
number of seats in an EOC do not feel that their current means of coordination would be 
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adequate for a large mass casualty or catastrophic event. Just as significant is the fact that 
40% do feel that their current means would be adequate. This could be a reflection of a 
number of factors: an extraordinarily efficient and capable process of coordination, the 
small number of entities coordinated, coordination resources present in the field through 
ICS, or the fact that the jurisdiction has not experienced an incident requiring the 
management of a large number of casualties. 
In summary, the current medical system is extensive, varied, and coordinated 
through a myriad of different means and agencies (or not at all). The system faces some 
significant current and future challenges. With little prospect for significant improvement 
of those challenges in the near future, it is imperative that the medical system resources 
available during a disaster are managed with the higher efficiency and effectiveness that a 
medical system coordinating center would offer. In the next section, I will discuss four 
jurisdictions that recognized this fact and took steps to ensure effective medical-system 
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III. COLLABORATION AND THE MEDICAL/PUBLIC-HEALTH 
SYSTEM NEXUS 
Two areas need further study to determine the success of a medical operations 
center and the environment in which it will operate. Any entity whose main purpose is to 
coordinate and communicate will need cooperation and collaboration from the various 
agencies involved. This holds especially true with any coordination of the medical 
system’s varied components. The collaboration can be forced or obtained willingly—but 
it has to occur. 
The differences between the medical and public-health systems, alluded to in 
earlier parts of the thesis, play an important part in defining any coordination entity. The 
local, regional, or state jurisdictions establishing a mechanism for medical system 
coordination need to be acutely aware of any differences or similarities between the two 
systems. 
In this section, each of these two areas and its relationship to medical-system 
coordination will be discussed. Specific questions about collaboration and the medical 
and public-health systems were asked of the focus groups and survey respondents. The 
answers to those questions will be incorporated into the discussion. 
A. COLLABORATION 
Willingness and ability to collaborate are crucial to any type of coordination 
effort. This is particularly true when trying to collaborate among the scores of disparate 
agencies, communities, and organizations that are outlined in the previous section. There 
must be a perceived need and a perceived value for all parties concerned. Even then, 
other variables must fall into place. Maldin et al. performed a set of qualitative interviews 
among thirteen different states and regions on the subject of group preparedness 
coordination. From this study the authors arrived at several key steps that enhanced the 
coordination efforts of the hospital groups. Some of these key steps are identified 
below.64 
                                                 
64 Maldin et al., “Regional Approaches to Hospital Preparedness,” 43–53. 
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• Creation of planning bodies; 
• Defining the regions; 
• Defining the gaps; 
• Support and leadership of hospital executives; 
• Neutral entity to bring together organizations that are historically 
competitors; 
• Engagement of trade associations and organizations. 
Since the medical operations centers must accomplish successful collaboration, 
each one of the focus groups provided input on what they perceived to be some of the 
positive variables that led to their successful collaboration. The focus groups also relayed 
what negative collaboration variables arose during the MOC development process. In the 
survey, the MMRS jurisdictions ranked a selected list of potentially positive collaboration 
variables and potential barriers. The survey allowed participants to provide their own 
potential barriers. 
The Houston focus group identified numerous activities that had led to positive 
collaboration. These included the effects of tropical storm Allison, the MMRS program, 
and unwavering support from Houston Emergency Management. The group also added 
persistence and a focus on positive outcomes, an atmosphere of trust, open 
communications, mutual respect, reaching consensus, actively seeking input, as positive 
activities. The process centered around a practical, lean, and functional regional plan, 
capturing and documenting all ideas, tracking and displaying progress to demonstrate 
forward movement, sharing best practices, visibility, and a shared workload. The lack of 
a scripted formula provided poetic license to create what they felt they needed. 
Positive collaboration factors provided by the San Antonio focus group included 
matching preparedness regions with medical system and catchment regions, a charismatic 
leader, suspending egos, and the preexisting credibility of the coordinating agency 
(STRAC). Other factors responsible for the program’s early successes included positive 
preexisting relationships, a perception of value, and understanding and accepting various 
personalities. The availability of preparedness funding also helped by getting people to 
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the table to start the collaboration process. The group also added that hurricane Katrina 
helped because it was the first activation; everyone worked together to solve problems, 
built trust to “air out dirty laundry,” and helped break down parochialism. 
Oklahoma City felt that the city’s shared experience with numerous disasters was 
an important background item that helped facilitate collaboration. Other factors 
mentioned included hardware and software provided to facilitate collaboration, 
significant support from hospital executives, demonstrating how competition disappears 
during a disaster, and a realization that it takes a total group effort to get through a 
disaster. The Oklahoma City medical community also perceived value from an MOC and 
expressed the desire for consistent and uniform processes, a shared vision of doing the 
greatest good, and a way for smaller hospitals to contribute. 
The Houston focus group felt that the negative collaboration variables were far 
fewer, but listed competition in health care, egos, and turf, mandates being 
counterproductive, the need to find common ground, and the lack of an existing model or 
plan to use as a template. 
San Antonio had more challenges to collaboration. The first challenge involved 
the general situation in Texas, a home-rule state with multiple parochial small 
jurisdictions grouped into different regions that share no commonality. There are regions 
for trauma and councils of government that do not coincide. Their catchment area forced 
them to work with multiple people from one discipline because multiple regions touched 
their catchment area. Other challenges included a lack of understanding of emergency 
management principles by public-health personnel, a lack of understanding of ESF-8 by 
emergency managers, a lack of depth in both understanding and the number of people 
who understand the challenges of a medical system response, and no “ringmaster” for the 
medical system. San Antonio also had to contact and convince someone from each sector 
of the value of the medical operations center, endure the parochial nature of cities whose 
leaders had to be convinced that events occurring outside city limits could eventually 
affect those inside city limits, and counter the perception that the MOC was adding 
another layer of bureaucracy. 
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Oklahoma City experienced the perception that all things are cured by technology, 
a persistent low-level competition among facilities, and facilities that maintained a 
position against sharing information. This group also discussed the lack of time and 
personnel to work the development, personal agendas that undermined group success, 
and a near-constant competition from other crisis priorities within the organization.  
The survey results also provided some interesting data that supports the 
information provided by the focus groups. The survey included a list of collaborative 
factors. The survey respondents ranked each factor from most important to least 
important. As Table 13 shows, the most important factors to support collaboration were a 
clear mission and purpose, perceived value by the participants, buy-in from executive 
level management, and clear lines of authority and responsibility. 
Many of the respondents used the opportunity to provide other collaborative 
factors not listed on the table. Some of the factors provided included: 
 
• “Integration (with the local jurisdiction) of the regional and state personnel 
and assets which reside in the local jurisdictional area.” 
• “What has worked very successfully in our area is the ability of agencies 
across disciplines to see beyond their traditional roles. We do not have as 
many “silos” to overcome as in some parts of the nation. Law enforcement 
(for example) plays an active role in many public health meetings without 
complaint. Just as public health plays a role in Hazmat.” 
• “Collaboration within the medical and emergency management community is 
important. Sheltering is a good example. Our MOC handles medical mass care 
operations, which includes medically fragile shelters. The Office of 
Emergency Services is charged with all general population shelters. Lines of 
responsibility have been drawn very carefully.” 
• “Tri state issues dealing with three state capitals as opposed to just one 
bureaucratic authority.” 
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• “This section is rather confusing since for this area we would consider most of 
these as being very important and that they would have definite impact on the 
collaborative effort.” 
• “MMRS and HRSA goals should be coordinated with CERT and MRC. Get 
the most medical response for a community by pushing for a higher payoff 
(major response) goals as a team approach versus each grant trying to 
purchase/train on non-supporting task.” 
In a similar process, the survey respondents also ranked a list of potential barriers 
for establishing a medical operations center. Table 14 shows the results of that ranking. 
The most significant barrier was the lack of available funding to develop a coordinating 
entity. Other significant barriers included competing city priorities, lack of authority, and 
lack of a clear oversight agency. Interestingly, respondents did not feel that cooperation 
and collaboration would present much of a barrier. 
The survey respondents also identified other potential barriers not included in the 
list. Some responses described the situation in the respondent’s particular jurisdiction, 
while others offered the clear potential barriers and thoughts listed below. 
• “The people who would operate within the EOC are the same people who 
generally run the HOC at each hospital and the administration will not let 
them leave. We have been trying to do this and have not been successful.” 
• “Lack of legal authority to execute actions.” 
• “The MOC would either interfere with, or add another layer to, the process for 
requesting resources.” 
• “Flexibility for the local jurisdiction to determine how coordinated healthcare 
response should be conducted while meeting state and federal initiatives.” 
• “Grant Silos—multiple grant flows with the same edicts, but agencies do not 
want to coordinate the functions due to the possibility of losing their part of 
the funding. We need one grant that is for all.” 
• “A commitment of integration of resources and assets. Most agencies know 
“integration talk” but are more concerned about their budgets and turf.” 
 54
• “Regionalization is a good idea in theory and on paper … but the rules as they 
now are definitely set in opposition from everything to governance to 
coordination to operational.” 
• “Jurisdictional boundaries of the medical system cross many other 
jurisdictions with separate emergency management centers. There may be 
some issues/resources that are competitive.” 
• “Sustainability, training, available personnel to utilize during an operation.” 
• “All medical operations should be conducted under the EOC as other agencies 
will most likely be affected as well. Should be co-located in one EOC.” 
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Table 13.   Ranked Impact of Positive Collaboration Factors. 
Please rank the impact of the following potential factors on positive collaboration and 
cooperation on a scale of 1-12 with 1 being the most important and 12 being the least important. 
Response 
Option 















6 7 5 2 6 7 2 3 2 0 0 3 43 4.81 
Clear lines of 
authority and 
responsibility 










8 6 1 5 4 5 1 4 3 3 2 1 43 5.19 
Regulation by 
state and local 
authorities 





2 4 2 4 2 4 6 3 5 4 9 0 45 7.02 





1 2 1 3 5 5 6 1 5 7 4 4 44 7.55 
Effective 
communication 
of needs and 
progress 










0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 7 6 10 11 44 9.93 
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Table 14.   Rating Impact of Barriers to Establishment of MOC. 
Please rate the impact of the following potential barriers for establishing a medical 
operations center should one be desired. 
Response Option 5 
High






Lack of available funding 31 8 7 1 0 2 6 55 4.29 
Competing city/regional 
priorities 
12 15 8 4 3 3 9 54 3.44 
Lack of statutory or ordinance 
authorities 
12 12 7 8 3 3 10 55 3.29 
Lack of a clear 
agency/organization to oversee 
center activities 
9 15 7 5 3 5 11 55 3.16 
Perception of duplication by 
emergency management agencies 
10 12 10 5 2 8 8 55 2.98 
No perception of actual need by 
the medical community 
7 12 11 8 3 6 8 55 2.87 
Perception of duplication by 
public health agencies 
5 13 13 9 0 7 8 55 2.85 
Lack of available space 9 8 11 5 7 6 8 54 2.76 
Competition of medical system 
organizations 
4 14 7 10 4 6 10 55 2.69 
Perception of duplication by 
public safety agencies 
5 8 12 10 3 8 9 55 2.52 
Lack of collaboration from 
medical system organizations 
5 5 13 9 8 5 9 54 2.44 
Involvement of for-profit 
organizations into mechanism 
3 10 10 5 10 6 10 54 2.39 
Lack of jurisdictional 
cooperation 
6 5 9 8 8 7 9 52 2.35 
Availability of technology 3 4 9 9 9 12 8 54 1.85 
Rating Average:  Responses yielding a positive number compiled and divided by the number of 
respondents providing a score.  Responses of N/A were not included in the equation 
B. THE MEDICAL AND PUBLIC-HEALTH SYSTEM NEXUS 
Earlier in the thesis, I made the case that the medical system and the public-health 
system were two distinct disciplines that have a long history of separate development and 
a different focus and methodology; at times they have been opposed to one another. 
Despite these differences, the two must end up working in concert to prevent, respond to, 
and recover from the health consequences of a mass casualty or public-health emergency. 
While the two systems are separate and different, they are both critically important and 
not mutually exclusive. 
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Although the differences between these two systems do not necessarily affect the 
determination of whether a medical-system coordination entity needs to be created, the 
differences do play a significant role in how such entities are formed and the type of 
activities that would be conducted by an MOC. The relationship between the medical 
system and public-health system could prove consequential in both the short-term 
operational success and the long-term survival of an MOC. I included the subject of the 
differences between the two in both my focus groups and the survey in order to determine 
whether the relationship and operational differences matched those found in the literature. 
I asked the focus groups how they thought the two systems were the same or 
different and their opinions on what those differences or similarities were. I also asked 
the groups about their opinion on splitting ESF-8 into two distinct emergency support 
functions—a rather radical step—to help determine how strongly they felt about the 
differences. 
Both the Houston and San Antonio groups felt that the public-health and medical 
systems were two distinctly different systems. The Oklahoma City focus group felt that 
each system was the component of the other and, while different, were strongly linked. 
When asked about similarities, the San Antonio group had little to offer. The Oklahoma 
City group pointed out that public health at times does direct patient care as in the 
isolation and care of TB patients.  
The Houston group said that there were similarities and that the two were 
absolutely connected. A “cycle of care” includes prevention, acute treatment, and 
activities to reduce a recurrence. The public-health and the medical systems both have 
key roles in that cycle and each one’s activities has a direct effect on the other’s 
activities. 
When asked about the difference, the majority of comments tended to address the 
different areas of focus. The Houston group said that the community and general-
population focus of public health was markedly different from the individual-based focus 
of the medical system. Oklahoma City echoed that opinion. The San Antonio group said 
that there was a difference in both the focus and the approach. The medical-system 
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entities often have to act immediately with action based upon incomplete information, 
while public health waits until complete information is available. The consequences of a 
wrong decision, when applied to a community intervention, can have catastrophic 
consequences—hence the tendency to wait for as much information as possible. 
Public health tends to face long-term corrective situations while medicine tends to 
be quick, fix it, and move on. While the public-health approach exists for a very good 
reason, during an emergency it may be difficult for public-health trained leadership to 
react quickly and make decisions. The San Antonio group felt that public-health 
physicians who tend to do well in emergencies are those with emergency-department 
backgrounds, which allows them to switch over to an immediate, partial-information, 
decision process. 
The survey asked similar questions of the MMRS jurisdiction respondents. The 
first question asks about the difference between the public-health system and the medical 
system. Table 15 shows that a large portion of the survey respondents felt that there was a 
significant difference between the two systems. 
 
Table 15.   Is There a Distinct Difference between the Medical System and the Public-
Health System? 
HSPD-21 differentiates between the medical system (healthcare activities geared towards 
to the individual) and the public health system (healthcare activities geared to 
populations). Do you feel that there is a distinct difference between the medical system 
and the public health system? 
Response Option Response Count Response Frequency 
Don’t know/no opinion 5 9.1% 
Yes, there is a difference 42 76.4% 
No, they are the same thing 8 14.5% 
Total Responses 55  
The next question attempted to determine the strength of the answer to the 
previous question. The results scored between “moderately strong” and “strongly.” 
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Table 16.   Strength of Opinion That Systems Are Different. 
 
 How strongly do you feel about the following? Note: “Don’t know/no opinion” answers 
were not part of the rating average. 
Response 
Options 






































*4=Very Strongly; 3=Strongly; 2=Moderately Strongly; 1=Somewhat Strongly; 0=Feel 
they are the same 
In order to double-check the previous response, and to view the opinion from a 
different angle, I asked how strongly the respondents felt that the two were the same. 
Table 17 shows that over 65% of the respondents once again felt that the medical and 
public-health systems were indeed different.  
 
Table 17.   Strength of Opinion That Systems Are the Same. 
 
How strongly do you feel about the following? Note: “Don’t know/no opinion” answers 
were not factored into the rating average. 
Response 
Options 









































*4=Very Strongly; 3=Strongly; 2=Moderately Strongly; 1=Somewhat Strongly; 0=Feel 




The survey’s next question attempted to determine what the respondents felt the 
relationship should be between a medical operations center and any public-health 
operations center that might be in existence. Given that the opinion of both the focus 
groups and the survey respondents held strongly that the medical system and the public-
health system were different, perhaps the coordinating entities should be different as well. 
Surprisingly, the answer shown in Table 18 shows that a significant number 
(68.5%) of the respondents felt that both entities should be together under public health in 
order to have consistency in managing ESF-8 activities. There appears to be recognition 
of the linkage and inter-dependence of the two systems. 
 
Table 18.   Opinion on Separating an MOC from a Public-Health Operations Center. 
 
 Should a medical operations center (if one was created) be separate and distinct from a 
public health operations center (if one exists)? 




Yes, they are distinctly different and coordinate markedly 
different activities 
17 31.5% 
No, they should be together under public health in order to 
have one point of contact for ESF-8 
37 68.5% 
 
The last area explored was the role that the two systems play in the medical and 
public-health emergency-support function (ESF-8) found in the National Response 
Framework and in most local and state emergency operations plans. ESF-8 serves as an 
umbrella functional area and contains both medical and public-health response activities. 
One agency must be designated the “lead” agency. This lead agency assignment at the 
federal and state level is not a problem—health agencies regulate both medical and health 
activities. It becomes more of a challenge at the local level where separate agencies may 
perform the lead role for each of the systems. If there is such a distinct difference, 
perhaps ESF-8 should separate into two or more unique functional areas. 
I asked the focus groups whether ESF-8 should separate into distinct functional 
areas. Even group members who vehemently pointed out how the two systems were 
different did not feel that ESF-8 should separate because “it’s all health care.” Some 
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groups felt that a distinction should be made within ESF-8 between a medical-system 
responsibility and a public-health system responsibility. Other group members suggested 
an ESF-8A and an ESF-8B. 
The survey asked a similar question: 
 
Table 19.   Opinion on Separation of ESF-8.  
 
 Do you feel ESF-8 should be separated into two distinct emergency support functions? 




Don’t know/No opinion. 8 14.3% 
There needs to be a separate ESF for medical system 
response and another ESF for public health system 
response. 
10 17.9% 
ESF-8 needs to maintain the current medical/public health 
overall function, but there needs to be a clear separation 
between the two systems and their activities within the ESF. 
18 32.1% 
ESF-8 is fine how it currently exists. Although there may be 
a difference in systems, the overall goal is health care. 
16 28.6% 
ESF-8 is fine how it currently exists. There is no difference 
between the two systems. 
4 7.1% 
 
Table 19 shows that the majority of the survey participants who offered an 
opinion (79%, n=38) did not support changing or separating ESF-8 into separate medical-
system and public-health-system functions. A majority of those who offered an opinion 
did say that there needs to be a clear separation between the functions of the two systems, 
either though separating the two (20%, n=10) or by making changes within the current 
ESF-8 (37.5%, n=18). 
C. ANALYSIS 
Collaboration among the various medical-system components is crucial for a 
successful MOC. I found the comment by the Houston focus group that “mandates don’t 




voluntary willingness to interact in a positive way. The best way to make this happen is 
to provide a perception of, or real, value for both parties so that the collaboration 
continues growing in a win-win situation.  
Another powerful mechanism for collaboration is a community’s first-hand 
experience of a disaster, when it realizes the need for an effective means of coordinating 
the medical system. Since we really do not want to rely on that sole facilitator, we must 
look for some of the other positive collaboration factors experienced by the focus groups 
and echoed by the survey participants. These factors include regionalization that matches 
the natural catchment region of the medical system; a neutral and charismatic leader; the 
establishment of consensus, no matter how painful; and a focus on positive outcomes and 
small victories. Additional collaboration facilitators include support from emergency 
management; public-health involvement; support from the executive level in the agencies 
and organizations that compose the medical system; availability of funding; and a shared 
vision of the challenge and the solution. It is also noteworthy that the collaboration 
factors outlined by the focus groups and survey participants were also remarkably similar 
to the variables for successful regionalization offered by Malden et al.65 
Barriers are inevitable when embarking on any new enterprise. It is important to 
recognize and inventory those barriers to determine first if the desired action is possible. 
If it proves to be possible, then the barriers need to be eliminated or at least mitigated. 
The survey participants, for the most part, were expressing perceived barriers, while the 
focus groups were presenting actual barriers experienced during the development of the 
MOC. Perceived barriers may turn out not to be barriers at all, while unanticipated 
problems can suddenly surface and present a challenge. Some issues, such as the lack of 
an established template for an MOC, can be either a barrier or an opportunity, depending 
on the approach.  
While the focus groups identified a few barriers, such as jurisdictional make-up, 
competition, competing priorities, and lack of understanding by emergency management 
and public health, the number of barriers seemed relatively low. The survey participants 
                                                 
65 Maldin et al., “Regional Approaches to Hospital Preparedness,” 43–53.  
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seemed to focus on the availability of funding. The reality is that funding is currently 
available from numerous grant sources. Even without the immediate availability of grant 
funding, the cost of establishing the rudimentary ability to coordinate the medical system 
is very low when compared to the potential gain. The $40,000 start-up cost of the 
Oklahoma City MERC is less than the cost of a single EMS command vehicle. 
The medical and public-health systems are two separate disciplines, but they are 
intertwined and interdependent. Through a long historical development process, the two 
systems emerged in silos with many differences in both focus and approach. More 
recently these silos were exacerbated by the emergency-preparedness grant mechanisms. 
Unlike the pre-9/11 MMRS program, which focused on locally administered and joint 
medical and public-health system development, the state-administered CDC and HRSA 
(now ASPR) grants were state administered and focused on a specific system. Unless a 
jurisdiction was as fortunate as San Diego and Boston to have both medical and public 
health under one agency, this meant that separate agencies received separate funding to 
do separate activities. The silos hardened. 
The focus-group discussions and survey results on this issue were enlightening. 
The Houston and San Antonio focus groups quickly and universally agreed that the two 
systems were markedly different. Oklahoma City preferred to state that each was a 
component of the other—another way of stating that they were interdependent. Although 
the groups were quick to point out the differences, they were hesitant to agree that ESF-8 
should be split and instead offered an option of ESF-8A and ESF-8B, another way of 
stating the overall shared and interdependent mission of both systems in providing health 
care. The survey respondents also felt strongly that the two systems were markedly 
different. Like the focus groups, and despite the agreement that the two are different 
systems, the survey respondents did not feel that ESF-8 should be split. A significant 
percentage (37.5%) also felt that both should be under ESF-8 but clearly delineated to 
mark the difference between the two systems.  
Most telling, however, was the response to whether or not the medical operations 
center should be operated outside of the public-health system. A large majority of the 
survey respondents felt that it should be put under public health to ensure one point of 
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contact for ESF-8, a clear indication that separation between the two systems is not 
desired. Other factors, including public health’s expertise and legal authorities and 
exceptions, also argue for the continuation of a connection between the two.  
Public health is relatively new to the concepts of immediate disaster response. 
The grant programs and their accompanying work requirements have helped to further 
the idea of separation. However, public health is learning. As one focus group member 
put it, “I would hate to exclude them; we have worked so hard to teach each other and 
have learned so much, I’m afraid that separation would be a step backwards.” 
In summary, the research has reinforced the fact that the two systems are 
different. It has also identified the need for some type of enhanced mechanism, such as a 
medical operations center, to effectively coordinate the myriad of challenges faced by the 
jurisdiction’s medical system during a disaster. Although the two systems are different, 
there is no need to separate ESF-8 into two different support functions. The differences 
between the two need to be clearly identified and recognized.  
Lastly, even though the medical system and public health are different, a medical 
operations center should not operate independently of the public-health system and would 
be better served working as part of the public-health system. The only remaining question 
is how to take this information and build something that serves both the local jurisdiction 
in particular and the nation as a whole. We can start by examining four medical 
operations centers currently serving the needs of their local communities. 
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IV. EXAMINATION OF CURRENT MEDICAL OPERATIONS 
CENTERS 
While many jurisdictions still utilize a small number of individuals in an EOC to 
coordinate particular sections of the medical system, other jurisdictions have already 
established a distinct medical operations center in order to coordinate the complex needs 
of the medical system during an emergency. These jurisdictions understand, or have 
experienced, some of the medical-system response challenges presented earlier. They 
realize the differences and similarities between the medical and public-health systems. 
They have already embarked upon the collaborative process and confronted some of the 
development challenges, instituting a relatively new concept in response coordination.  
To help describe the concept of an MOC, I will present four of these jurisdictions 
and discuss the journey of their development. Each jurisdiction developed its MOC 
independently, yet there are many similarities in both experience and final product. 
Included in the discussion are the origins, structure, and function of each MOC. Each 
jurisdiction has adopted a different name for its respective center, but the functionality is 
the same. 
Some of the centers presented have actually operated the MOC during an actual 
mass-casualty incident or public-health emergency. The lessons learned during these real 
activations will help establish the need, function, and applicability of the medical 
operations center concept. 
A. OKLAHOMA CITY66 
Name: Oklahoma City Medical Emergency Response Center (MERC). 
Main Sponsoring Agencies:  The Emergency Medical Service Authority (EMSA) 
and the Greater Oklahoma City Hospital Council (GOCHC). 
                                                 
66 The material in this discussion and that of Tulsa, except where otherwise noted, comes from the 
author’s notes and experiences as the director of the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems in Oklahoma 
City and Tulsa and his participation in the development of the Medical Emergency Response Center in 
those two cities. 
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Established: 1999. 
The Oklahoma City MERC did not originate after the Murrah bombing in 1995. 
After that incident many of the hospitals and EMS agencies agreed that there needed to 
be greater coordination and information flow, but any changes that occurred were 
internal. After the May 3, 1999, tornado that left 45 dead and over 800 injured, the 
hospital and EMS agencies realized that they were in the same room talking about the 
same issues that had occurred several years earlier, and they decided to act. The 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) contract between the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) and Oklahoma City began shortly thereafter 
and provided some of the initial funding for the center.  
The MERC was initially located in the training room at EMSA Headquarters. 
EMSA wired the room for internet connection, 25 phone lines, two radios, and a 
duplicate CAD console. Cabinets stored the equipment for deployment upon need. 
EMSA administrative staff in the building, supplemented by on-call hospital personnel, 
operated the center on activation.  
This dual use of space was cost effective but provided some challenges to 
equipment security and training schedules. When Oklahoma City remodeled its old 911 
center into a regional EOC, a dedicated and permanent space was provided for the 
MERC.  
The current MERC has the capability of housing up to 20 positions. Each position 
has a dedicated phone and laptop. The MERC has two duplicate EMS computer-aided 
dispatch consoles that allow the capability to communicate with EMS transport officers 
in the field. There are multiple electronic visual display boards and a specific area 
designated for HAM radio communications. 
The Oklahoma City MERC is an on-call coordination center. It is not staffed 
unless there is a perceived or actual need for medical-system coordination. One FTE from 
EMSA is dedicated to the MERC to provide training, coordinate drills, maintain the on-
call schedule, and ensure that the equipment is in operating order. The remainder of the 
staffing comes from personnel designated from the local participating agencies. Four 
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personnel are on call each month. If the MERC activates, these individuals report to the 
MERC along with EMS and public-health personnel, begin the coordination process, and 
assess the situation to determine the need for additional staffing. If additional staffing is 










Figure 1.   The Oklahoma City MERC during an exercise. (Photo by Mike Curtis, 
used with permission.) 
 
The MERC provides space for numerous agencies including the hospital system, 
EMS, public health, and the American Red Cross. Being located with the regional EOC 
also provides instant access to public-safety and utility representatives. The MERC 
provides coordination for forty-two hospitals, eight EMS agencies, seven public-health 
departments, and a host of other medical-system components. 
The Oklahoma City MERC acts as the ESF-8 coordinating body for the 
Oklahoma City metropolitan area and works closely with the Oklahoma City/County 
Health Department (OCCHD). OCCHD has established its own internal area within its 
agency to help coordinate its activities should it have to stand up multiple-medication 
distribution or mass-vaccination sites. This was done not only because OCCHD wanted 
to coordinate from its own building, but also because the space available for the MERC 
was deemed too small to coordinate all the activities associated with the possibility of 
multiple mass-immunization sites operating at the same time that the hospital and EMS 
system were overloaded during a public-health emergency. OCCHD provides a 
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representative liaison on all MERC activations to provide public-health advice and to 
connect back to the OCCHD facility if both are operating simultaneously. 
The public-health agencies in the remaining six counties manage their response 
through four areas commands—all coordinated out of the MERC. The Oklahoma City 
MERC is one of several regional MERCs in the state that coordinate response 
information flow and prioritizations with the state medical and public-health operations 
center located at the Oklahoma State Department of Health. 
The Oklahoma City MERC activated during 9/11 to monitor hospital supply 
needs when all air traffic came to a stop. In 2003, the MERC activated on two successive 
nights for tornado strikes in Oklahoma City. The MERC helped coordinate medical-
system needs when a severe ice storm created a two-week power outage in 2007. Most 
recently, the MERC coordinated patient distribution during hurricane Gustav when 
military aircraft brought hospital patients to the city from Louisiana. Oklahoma City also 
hosted eighteen hundred victims from Louisiana during Gustav, and the MERC helped 
coordinate the medical response to a large congregate shelter for the evacuees. Each of 
the MERC activations shared two common characteristics: the coordination was needed 
and appreciated, while each incident presented a totally different set of challenges for the 
medical system.  
B. TULSA 
Name: Tulsa Medical Emergency Response Center (MERC). 
Main Sponsoring Agencies: The Emergency Medical Service Authority (EMSA) 
and the Tulsa Hospital Council (THC). 
Established: 1999. 
While Tulsa has been fortunate to miss the frequency and severity of the disasters 
experienced by Oklahoma City, the city was deeply affected by those disasters and has its 
own history of numerous significant floods. Consequently, Tulsa spends a significant 
amount of energy on preparedness efforts and has a well-established and functional joint 
city/county emergency-management agency. Tulsa was a willing partner to Oklahoma 
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City in 1999 when a joint MMRS development project was proposed. Part of that 
development was the establishment of a MERC in Tulsa to complement the one 
established in Oklahoma City. Both cities agreed to support each other’s medical needs 
during a disaster involving mass casualties; the two MERCs constitute the mechanism to 
coordinate such support. The oversight, function, and mission are similar, but the 
structure of each MERC is different, reflecting the differences between the two cities. 
The Tulsa MERC was initially located in a police briefing room at the Tulsa 911 
center. Like Oklahoma City the dual-use room was the only available space, was initially 
cost-effective, but eventually ran into conflicts with scheduling. The Tulsa MERC 
relocated to its current location when the Tulsa Area Emergency Management Agency 
(TAEMA) allocated space in its EOC. The Tulsa MERC currently coordinates a smaller 
number of hospitals and EMS agencies, and the design of the room reflects that smaller 
number. There are seven hospitals, one EMS agency, and one health department. Each 
agency has been provided a lockable workstation in the MERC, complete with computer 
and phone. Each agency can bring along plans, documents, and references unique to its 
agency to keep in the workstation prepared for ready access during activations. Like 
Oklahoma City, the Tulsa MERC has multiple phone lines, computer terminals, radios, 
and a duplication of the EMS computer-aided dispatch station. There is also direct access 
to the main floor of the EOC and the public safety, private sector, and government 
representatives located there. The Tulsa City/County Health Department (TCCHD) has 
also developed its own internal coordinating center for large public-health responses. 
This room, located at its main headquarters building, acts as the back-up MERC should 
the primary MERC become unusable.  
The ESF-8 responsibilities in Tulsa are split between EMSA and the TCCHD. 
The MERC acts as the primary coordination center for the medical system in Tulsa and 
coordinates public-health activities through the MERC-TCCHD liaison. 
In December 2007, Tulsa experienced a severe ice storm that downed power lines 
and pulled electric meters away from houses. Consequently, the entire metropolitan Tulsa 
area was without power for up to two weeks, creating a full activation of the Tulsa 
MERC along with the Tulsa EOC. From initially coordinating the hospital status and 
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patient movement from a busy EMS system, the role of the MERC quickly transitioned to 
addressing the needs of power-dependent medical patients at home and nursing homes 
wishing to evacuate, providing medical support for several large shelter operations and 
power for one large dialysis center to handle the needs of the entire city population. The 













Figure 2.   The Tulsa MERC. (Photo by Johnnie Munn, used with permission) 
 
Toward the end of the incident, the Tulsa MERC coordinated the medical support 
for “Operation Power Up,” a massive effort by the city that combined medical, fire, and 
power company resources to go through neighborhoods, check the welfare of the 
residents, and replace power meters to restore electricity. 
C. SAN ANTONIO67 
Name: Regional Medical Operations Center (RMOC). 
Main Sponsoring Agencies: Southwest Texas Regional Advisory Council on 
Trauma (STRAC). 
                                                 
67 The material in this discussion, except where otherwise noted, comes from the author’s focus group 
of San Antonio RMOC representatives on May 14, 2008, and an interview with Eric Epley, STRAC 
Director, conducted on October 2, 2008. 
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Established: after September 11, 2001. 
The idea for a regional medical coordination center actually began in the 1990s 
during several exercises where participants noticed that the EOC had several 
representatives who could reach back to their respective agencies, but one person was 
expected to reach back to twenty hospitals. Attempts to form an MOC met with 
resistance, and the medical system instead focused on trauma systems development, 
although the need for some type of coordination capability remained in the background, 
and conceptual meetings still occurred.  
The events of 9/11 created a situation where the military bases and the base 
hospitals that were such a critical component of the medical system went to threat-level 
Delta and effectively closed. This created the need to make rapid adjustments with the 
remaining accessible hospitals and once again demonstrated the need for medical system 
coordination during a disaster.  
The subsequent planning process for terrorism, and the availability of funding, 
brought the issue up again. Active planning resumed with STRAC taking the lead 
because of its leadership and preexisting relationship with the hospitals. 
The San Antonio RMOC was initially located at the STRAC offices. STRAC 
converted a large training/meeting room to dual-use capability. San Antonio provided 
dedicated space for the RMOC when the city built a new EOC. The RMOC has over 20 
possible positions with tables grouped according to specific functionality: 
Command/Control/Admin, Hospitals, EMS, and Public Health, and Medical Special 
Needs.  The RMOC is an on-demand center with staffing provided by STRAC personnel 
and representatives from hospitals, EMS, special needs agencies, and public health 
reporting during activation. The main duties of the RMOC are patient destination 
coordination, timely patient flow, resource coordination for the medical system, and 
addressing the medical special-needs patients during a disaster.  
The first real test of the RMOC occurred during hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
During two twenty-four-hour periods, the RMOC was activated and coordinated the 
interhospital transfer of 781 patients and “thousands of evacuees and special needs 
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patients.”68 A retrospective study determined that the RMOC, based upon the principles 
of cooperation and communication, allowed for a more rapid transfer of hospitalized and 
special-needs patients during a disaster/mass-casualty situation.69  
 
 
Figure 3.   The San Antonio RMOC during a hurricane exercise in May, 2008, 
showing the hospital coordination tables. (Photo by Mike Curtis, used with 
permission) 
 
Following those storms, the state of Texas engaged in a coordinated planning 
process to address the situation of a large hurricane striking the Texas coast. The state 
established the city of San Antonio as a major regional coordination center (Alamo 
Command) for evacuation of the southern half of the Texas Gulf coast. Consequently, the 
San Antonio RMOC became a coordination center, not just for the immediate San 
Antonio area, but also for a large section of the state. The RMOC developed teams of 
deployable medical personnel that would respond to the threatened area and act as 
forward command and control elements for the RMOC. 
In the summer of 2008, hurricanes Gustav and Ike tested that planning and 
expanded scope. The RMOC remained operational 24/7 for over four weeks. The RMOC 
deployed forward teams into the Rio Grande Valley when that area was threatened and 
                                                 
68 Epley et al., “A Regional Medical Operations Center Improves Disaster Response and Inter-
Hospital Trauma Transfers,” 853–59. 
69 Ibid. 
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evacuation appeared necessary. The RMOC coordinated all medical resources coming 
into the regional command area. Food and shelter had to be coordinated for the transport 
staging area, which at one point had swelled to 525 ambulances. The RMOC created 
scores of “paramedic buses” by assigning a paramedic team to a bus in order to increase 
the transport capacity for medical special-needs patients. Several DMAT teams assigned 
to the area coordinated their activities through the RMOC.  
In its command and control structure, the RMOC activated a hospital branch, a 
public-health branch, and an acute health-care branch. Evacuees from both Texas and 
Louisiana were streaming into the area, and their medical needs created an additional 
challenge for the RMOC.  
The RMOC coordinated over two thousand patient moves during the two 
hurricanes. When hurricane Ike took a sudden turn toward Galveston and Houston, the 
RMOC also had to coordinate the movement of staged medical assets away from the no-
longer-threatened southwestern part of Texas and toward Houston. Without the presence 
of a pre-existing RMOC, such herculean medical logistic challenges would have been 
difficult or impossible to meet. 
D. HOUSTON70 
Name: Houston Catastrophic Medical Operations Center (CMOC). 
Main Sponsoring Agencies: Southeast Texas Trauma Regional Advisory Council 
(SETRAC). 
Established: 2001. 
The beginnings of the Houston CMOC go back to the start of the Houston MMRS 
contract in 1997. The requirements of the contract forced various agencies to plan 
together in order to meet the MMRS deliverables. These planning efforts led to the 
development of relationships and continued planning after the deliverables were 
                                                 
70 The material in this discussion, except where otherwise noted, comes from the author’s focus group 
with Houston CMOC representatives on May 13, 2008, and an interview with Doug Havron, SETRAC 
Director, conducted on November 6, 2008. 
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completed. The planning groups looked at lessons learned from other incidents, and EMS 
desired some type of central coordinating entity. 
The sentinel event for the CMOC development occurred in June 2001 with the 
arrival of tropical storm Allison and severe flooding that devastated Houston. Several 
hospitals in the Texas Medical Center flooded and required evacuation, a massive 
undertaking. The hospital system was crippled, and two main entities spontaneously 
arose in an attempt to coordinate resources. This actually created confusion and chaos as 
the two entities failed to communicate and vied for the same resources. The after-action 
review of the incident demonstrated an obvious need for one clearly identified medical 
coordination center. The MMRS planning groups, under the auspices of the Houston 
Office of Emergency Management, began developing that center. 
The CMOC is currently located in the Houston EOC. The Houston EOC is 
actually an EOC that coordinates the efforts of departmental centers located elsewhere. 
Of the 44 positions in the Houston EOC, 13 of them are dedicated to coordinating the 
medical and pubic-health response to an incident, a testament to the value placed on the 
CMOC by the Houston Office of Emergency Management. Each position has several 
computer screens and an integrated headset, internal/external communications system. 
All the positions face a large display wall board whose images are monitored and 
controlled by a separate monitor control room. This allows the representative to visualize 
the large boards or select the boards he or she wishes to view from the smaller monitor at 
the position. 
SETRAC and Houston Office Emergency Management jointly administer the 
CMOC. The Houston metropolitan area is divided into four quadrants for hospital 
planning with twenty to forty hospitals in each quadrant. Each quadrant has a seat in the 
CMOC. That seat is filled by a leader elected by the hospitals in the quadrant. 
Upon activation, each quadrant is responsible for providing staff for its position. 
SETRAC and Houston Emergency Management also provide staff. Public health and 
EMS provide their own representatives. The City of Houston provides operational 
training for all CMOC representatives. 
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Figure 4.   The Houston Catastrophic Medical Operations Center. (CMOC). (Photo 
by Mike Curtis, used with permission) 
 
The primary mission of the CMOC is to protect the health-care system during a 
large incident. As an incident grows in scale, so does the type of response required. There 
are systems and protocols in place to handle the day-to-day management of the medical 
system. Even moderate incidents may be mitigated without the CMOC by corporate or 
regional sister facilities assisting a stricken hospital. The CMOC becomes engaged when 
the incident renders the “normal” systems ineffective and is large enough to affect the 
entire medical system to the point where an umbrella effort is necessary.  
Like San Antonio, the Houston CMOC now figures largely in the state of Texas 
hurricane evacuation plans and incorporates much of southeast Texas. The capabilities of 
the CMOC were also put to the test during hurricanes Gustav and Ike in the summer of 
2001. During hurricane Gustav, the CMOC assisted with the evacuation of medical 
special-needs patients from the Beaumont and Port Arthur areas.  
There was a certain degree of confusion between the operational plan for the 
CMOC to coordinate ambulances and the governor’s Department of Emergency 
Management’s unilateral control of all resources. A meeting to work out those issues was 
cancelled due to the sudden arrival of hurricane Ike and the significant threat posed to the 
Galveston-Houston area. 
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The CMOC remained activated 24/7 for thirty-one days. Just before the 
hurricane’s landfall, the 211 system shut down, and for some unknown reason the calls 
were forwarded to the CMOC for an eight-hour period. Once the storm’s track became 
clear, numerous nursing homes and homebound patients were identified in the high-risk 
flooding area. In an amazing coordination of resources between the CMOC and the 
Forward Coordinating Elements, over five hundred medical patients were moved to 
safety during a 12-hour overnight period.  
During the height of the storm, the Houston EOC lost power, which disrupted 
communications for twelve hours. Fortunately, redundant systems allowed the CMOC to 
continue operating. The CMOC continued to operate after the storm had passed. The 
extended power outage created additional problems for the medical system. Over two 
hundred nursing homes were evacuated to schools, medical special-needs shelters, or 
hospitals. The hospital system experienced a great many power issues. Although powered 
by generators, many of the generators failed from lack of available fuel or mechanical 
breakdown after weeks of operating. The CMOC had to coordinate the evacuation of 
fifty-nine hospitals during the weeks following the storm. Operating the CMOC for such 
an extended time presented staffing issues. Hospitals would not release assigned 
personnel, and the CMOC operated at times with minimal staffing.  
Throughout these incidents, the Houston medical system was affected to the point 
that the normal mechanisms failed. Facilitating the hundreds of immediate action items 
needed to take care of the patients in the system would have been impossible without a 
medical coordinating center like the Houston CMOC. 
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V. PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL MOC NETWORK 
In the previous sections of this thesis, I have outlined the differences between the 
medical and public-health systems, their similarities, and their complexities. I have also 
demonstrated the need to provide an augmented means of coordinating the prevention, 
response, and recovery activities of a medical system whose key elements are numerous 
in number and expansive in scope. I have also shown how the current health-care 
environment will make this coordination even more challenging as the future unfolds.  
I have provided several tangible examples of how some jurisdictions have 
addressed this coordination challenge and mitigated actual disaster responses. Many 
know the problems, and the mechanisms to solve the problems in the form of medical 
operations centers are gradually evolving around the nation. This evolution, however, is 
sporadic, haphazard, and lacking in consistency of mission and focus beyond the actual 
or perceived needs of the local or regional jurisdiction—a dangerous proposition in the 
face of multistate or national calamity.  
There must be a nationally driven program to assist local jurisdictions and state 
governments in creating such coordination centers. This program must provide 
leadership, guidance, consistency, and support in an effort to build a national network of 
medical operations centers. The medical operations center will not only meet local needs 
but will serve as a hub of coordination and information for a statewide or national 
response. 
Medical operations centers already exist in numerous local jurisdictions and their 
constitution, structure, and mission vary from place to place. Some existing centers 
combine both medical and public-health system activities under one roof, while others 
are very parochial and protective of their single medical-system coordination role.  
The creation of such a networked system will certainly face some significant 
challenges. Many of the struggles encountered by the existing centers will occur in the 
creation of a national network: apathy and the need for buy-in; and concerns over the 
duplication of effort, organizational structure, funding, authority, mission and scope, 
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competition, and physical space. These challenges can be overcome, as demonstrated by 
cities such as Houston, Oklahoma City, and Boston.  
The question of whether or not to build the system is also moot; the system is 
being built now at the local level—it just needs direction, support, and consistency in 
order to achieve a national level capability. Given the potentially catastrophic threats that 
the nation faces, and the fact that centers are now being formed, national leadership has 
an excellent opportunity to create a network that will serve the medical and public-health 
systems well into the future. Success lies in leadership and authorities, a focus on 
consistent functions, organizational and financial support, technology, and recognition of 
both formal and informal communications mechanisms. I will outline below just how 
easily that might be accomplished.  
A. LEADERSHIP 
The government of the United States was established as a federal system with 
much of the responsibility for governing reserved for state governments. This has led to a 
natural reluctance or legal prohibition for federally driven projects that dictate how states 
should operate. This reluctance is present in the various federally funded preparedness 
programs. The federal agency provides very general guidelines and permits the states or 
local communities to plan, produce, and procure to meet their own needs within those 
guidelines. While this is ostensibly done because the states know their citizen’s needs, it 
often leads to a menagerie of different structures and equipment that is not interoperable 
with other states or national entities. One has only to look at training programs or 
databases such as those found in the ESAR-VHP program to see this in action. Since 
situational awareness and rapid decision making processes are essential to a large scale 
medical response, interoperability in the medical operations centers around the country is 
crucial. While some regional specifics can vary, there must be consistencies in 
communication pathways, resource typing, and at least a minimal number of functional 
capabilities.  
The leadership for such an ambitious project must come from the federal level. A 
large-scale, long-term, consistent vision at the national level, expressed and supported by 
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key leadership in the federal agencies that share the responsibility for protecting 
America’s health, is required. Just as important, leadership must be demonstrated in both 
the legislative and executive branches in order to allow the officials to perform the work 
needed and to ensure that funding continues for the development and sustainment of the 
network. 
Federal officials should be cautious about prescribing and dictating the formation 
of the network by means of mandate. A mandate may accomplish compliance and the 
quicker formation of a network, but it may not allow the collaboration and buy-in needed 
to sustain success at the local level. The federal government may select the designated 
and/or funded cities and thus lay out the plot of the network, but the emphasis should be 
on a communicated need, purpose, and vision combined with minimal required functional 
capabilities and communication pathways. The sharing of lessons learned from those 
jurisdictions that have already implemented an MOC and examples of best practices and 
successful utilization during an actual response will also assist in the development of the 
national network. 
Horizontal collaboration and communication at the national level will also assist 
the local and state jurisdictions trying to develop a medical operations center capability. 
Explaining the project’s purpose, scope, and functions can lead to acceptance, 
understanding, and support from professional organizations, who can communicate to 
their respective membership bases at the local and state level. American Hospital 
Association support at the national level can result in an increased willingness by local 
facilities to either take a leadership role or at least participate in the formation of an MOC 
at the local level. Likewise, demonstrating to the International Association of Emergency 
Managers that the MOC does not replace, but augments, an EOC may remove potential 
resistance from emergency managers at the local level. 
One of the first actions that can be taken at the federal level in concert with the 
development of an MOC network is to recognize and acknowledge the difference 
between the medical and public-health systems and to restructure ESF-8 in the National 
Response Framework to reflect those differences. The consensus of those surveyed and 
interviewed was to keep health and medical within the same emergency-support function, 
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but ESF-8 needs to have separate sections for medical and public health. One section 
would encompass functions consistent with care provided to an individual while the 
second section would encompass those community-based functions normally performed 
by public-health agencies. A third section could include the medical special-needs patient 
response and other functions that do not fit neatly into either of the first two sections. 
The federal government can also take an immediate step towards building the 
MOC network through the various grant programs that provide significant funding for 
medical and public-health system preparedness. These grant programs, most of which 
already hold interoperable communications as a priority, can further define that grant 
focus area as an explicit desire for a medical and public-health coordination capability. 
Either through a directly expressed intent or through using the functional components that 
will be outlined later in this chapter, the grant guidelines can provide direction and 
initiate thought and action toward the establishment of both an MOC and a link with 
other centers in nearby jurisdictions.  
Effective leadership at the local, regional, and state levels is just as important. The 
medical operations center’s primary purpose is to serve the local and regional health 
system during a mass-casualty incident or a public-health emergency. Consequently, the 
local and/or regional establishment of an individual MOC will be the primary link to any 
national network for medical-system coordination. 
One of the most important facilitators for successful collaboration is the presence 
of a “champion,” an individual with the drive and respect to keep the development 
process going through slow periods and over the unavoidable hurdles. While the creation 
of a national network of medical operations centers will certainly require leadership and 
direction from the federal level, it is the leadership of the individual medical operations 
center, supported by local, regional, and state partners, that will ultimately determine the 
degree of success of the MOC. Any national network will only be as strong as the sum of 
its individual MOCs. Thus, local and regional capability must be established in order to 
create a strong national network that will serve all the health-care systems in the nation. 
Ideally, a local or regional champion, in the form of an individual, group, or agency, will 
initiate the formation of a medical operations center. That champion needs support from 
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both the local health-care system, as well as state and federal government agencies, and 
must be allowed to lead the formation process. The leadership group overseeing the 
formation of the medical operations center must be aware of the needs and desires of the 
health-care system and must establish the center’s purpose and organizational structure so 
as to meet those needs. 
While the national network may be built through a federal vision and funding 
combined with a local and regional grassroots development, state government must also 
demonstrate leadership and a willingness to become an integral part of the network. The 
federal system imparts significant authority and responsibility to state government. Any 
particular state government can become a powerful facilitator of the network or or an 
impediment by inhibiting the formation and/or participation of local and regional medical 
operations centers. A state-level medical operations center can act as a coordination 
element between the local and federal levels and offer effective span of control and 
compilation of reportable information and data. The local and regional medical 
operations centers can report up to the state-level MOC. This will create a statewide 
network of medical operations centers that may be all that is needed to manage a regional 
incident. Done correctly, the national network would be a “network of networks,” with 
the hub points being the state-level MOC.  
In states with large rural areas, the state MOC could act as the default MOC for 
those medical facilities. These areas may lack a clearly identified concentration of 
medical resources and/or referral centers and would rely on the state MOC for 
information and resource coordination.  
While the state MOC would be a hub, with information coming in from the local 
and regional MOCs, each regional MOC will need to be able to communicate with the 
others within the state, and possibly with neighboring MOCs in other states. The federal 
government may need to communicate directly with a local or regional MOC. While the 
control of the information flow and resource utilization is important, the state will need to 
be mindful of the other communication pathways between MOCs and avoid regulating or 
restricting information exchange between MOCs in an effort to assert total control of all 
information. This informal information exchange will likely occur anyway and should be 
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encouraged. This will likely require a degree of leadership on the part of state personnel 
to move away from the traditional hierarchical reporting structure. 
B. AUTHORITIES 
In order to function, each MOC that makes up the network will need some degree 
of authority. It will also need to be the unique coordination center for that local 
jurisdiction, region, or state. There are numerous ways of providing the needed authority: 
statute, directive, regulation, grant requirement, plan, mutual benefit, and perceived 
value. Any one, or combination of authorities, may be needed to ensure that the proper 
level of participation is received from the medical community. 
The strongest authority comes from legislative or governing bodies that enact 
rules requiring participation in an MOC. Laws can be passed, directives can be issued 
from executives, or regulations enacted requiring participation. While this can be very 
effective in empowering the MOC, the process can be difficult, inflexible, and time 
consuming. One must also be mindful of the statements of one focus group that 
mandating the hospital system may result in compliance but not overt cooperation. The 
requirements could get lost in the sea of other regulations that burden the medical system.  
The existing authority held by public-health agencies at the state and local levels 
is one of the arguments for combining the MOC and the public-health coordinating 
center. There may not be a need to create authority; it may already exist within the 
public-health agency. 
Less effective but more easily accomplished are grant requirements and planning 
and procedure documents. By placing the establishment of an MOC within some federal 
or state grant requirements, local jurisdictions may be willing to investigate the idea. If a 
facility needs to participate in order to receive preparedness funding, it will at least look 
at the concept. This process is conditional, and the MOC may not get any attention 
beyond checking off a box on a report to secure funding. Facilities may also look at the 
participation as an additional workload of unknown scope and choose not to participate in 
the funding program altogether, a highly undesirable outcome. Placing the MOC into 
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emergency response plans may eventually engrain the MOC into the response culture and 
provide the needed level of authority and participation. Participation will occur because 
“that’s the way it has always been done” or there are written plans stating that is what 
needs to happen. The plan-insertion method requires some initial development, a means 
to sustain the minimal operational capability, and a great deal of time. Real success will 
likely occur from the last means of achieving the needed authorities: mutual benefit and 
perceived value. 
Any organization will seek out and participate in an activity or pursuit if it feels 
there is a benefit to that particular organization. Groups of organizations are more likely 
to interact and participate in a joint activity if there is a mutual benefit for all from that 
activity. The medical system is no different. The most potent means of obtaining true 
authority as well as willing participation and eager support is to demonstrate how the 
MOC serves the interests of the medical community. Once that has been accomplished, 
the MOC will be supported and defended by the medical community and will be easily 
established as a critical and powerful element of the response infrastructure. This benefit 
must be described, demonstrated, and consistent. The MOC must establish a level of 
credibility within the medical system. Once established, the MOC must maintain the level 
of performance expected by the medical community. Plans must be achievable and 
performance consistent; freelancing and sidestepping the expected processes should be 
discouraged lest the medical community become uncertain of the MOC’s capability and 
therefore of the parochial benefit to itself. The heart of the performance of the MOC will 
be its self-described functionality—what it does for the medical community and how the 
network of MOCs will benefit the state and the nation. 
C. MOC FUNCTIONS 
Because there are many medical operations centers already existing around the 
nation, in many various forms and capabilities, it would be imprudent to attempt to build 
the national network by prescribing in detail exactly where and how an MOC should be 
established, where it should be located, who should manage it, and other specific details. 
The building blocks for consistency throughout the network are a specific set of functions 
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performed by the MOC regardless of its location and structure. If every MOC in the 
nation can perform a certain set of tangible functions, consistent from the local MOC 
through the state and up to the federal level, the network will then have a defined 
purpose, a clear scope, a consistent mission, and it will become a vibrant entity with a 
clear benefit to the medical system at all levels. Because the network will be strongest by 
creating a two-way flow of information and coordination, the functions of the MOC 
should clearly serve two purposes: to meet the needs of the local or regional medical 
system, and to meet the needs of the state and federal agencies responsible for overseeing 
and coordinating a response. I will discuss some of the basic functionalities needed by 
each MOC below. 
1. Primary Point of Contact  
The MOC should be the primary point of contact for the particular medical 
system it serves. In areas where public-health coordination occurs in a different location, 
a strong liaison with the public-health agency will need to be forged and clear areas of 
responsibility delineated. There cannot be duplicative centers, each believing it has 
operational responsibility and thereby creating confusion for the medical system. The 
MOC should be identified, tangible, and easily accessible on a 24/7 basis. The medical 
community must be aware of the MOC’s purpose, limitations, means of access, and 
functioning. State and federal authorities will also need to know the locations of the 
MOCs and their areas of responsibility. A federal or military response team’s medical 
component should be able to hit the ground and contact the MOC in that area for a 
situational update and medical intelligence. The functionalities of the MOC cannot be 
buried inside an obscure set of agencies and departments; the functionalities must be 
centralized and transparent. 
2. All-Hazards Approach  
The MOC must be prepared to provide its core functions during any type of 
response. Consequently, it must reach out to all elements of the medical system in order 
to have the contacts and familiarity to meet the needs of the entire medical system. The 
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MOC should not be designed for a particular part of the medical system. It must be 
flexible, adaptable, and capable of addressing whatever needs arise. In 2007 a major ice 
storm hit Oklahoma City and created long-term power outages to the entire metropolitan 
area. The Oklahoma City MERC activated initially to address the perceived needs of the 
hospital and EMS system from an increased patient load and transportation challenges. 
However, the MERC found itself staying operational for ten days in order to meet the 
needs of long-term-care facilities, dialysis units, homebound patients, and carbon-
monoxide-exposure patients. 
3. Situational Awareness  
A vital function of the national network will be the ability to quickly and reliably 
obtain a consistent level of situational awareness. This function will begin at the local or 
regional level and should permeate the entire network up to the federal government. The 
situational awareness will involve a two-way flow of information: local medical systems 
will want to know the bigger picture in the state and the country, while state and national 
leaders will want a compiled assessment of local situations in order to form that bigger 
picture. Situational awareness means different things to different people. I will briefly 
describe how the MOC can function in three elements of awareness. 
a. Common Operating Picture  
The medical system frequently operates “in the dark” during a sudden 
disaster that creates mass casualties. The system tends to focus on its own existing 
patients, new patients coming into the ED, EMS triage/transport, and the particular 
threats and problems unique to its own facility. The MOC, through its connections with 
the ICS if there is a scene, and the other components of the medical system, can gather 
the status reports, scene descriptions, challenges and opportunities found and can compile 
an operating picture. That operating picture can be shared, through text or video, with all 
the elements of the system at the local, regional, state, or federal level. Conversely, the 
MOC can receive the operating picture from the state and federal agencies and relay that 
information down to the local level. The MOC can produce an incident action plan for the 
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medical system that incorporates local, state, and national goals. Even during a slowly 
evolving public-health emergency, the MOC can monitor the effects of the infectious or 
toxic agent on the medical system, inform local, state, and federal public-health agencies, 
and in turn relay public-health information and desired actions from all levels of the 
network to the medical community. 
b. Intelligence 
Natarajan argues for a medical intelligence center at the national level that 
supports many of the observations in the present research project.71 The national network 
of MOCs could become a provider of information to a national intelligence center. 
Combined with public-health information, the flow of medical system assessments, 
information, and local/state operating pictures fed up to the national level would allow for 
a compiled and processed intelligence report and a solid national picture of an incident’s 
effect on the nation’s medical systems. Conversely, the national network of MOCs would 
provide a rapid, reliable, and secure means of distributing processed information from 
state and federal authorities to the elements of the medical system that need the 
information. As mentioned earlier, medical response resources sent into an area can 
obtain local intelligence from the area’s MOC. 
c. System Assessment 
The MOC would be in the best position to provide an accurate assessment 
of the status of the medical system. Collectively, through the network, authorities could 
gain a picture of the overall impact of an incident on the system; this information would 
facilitate informed decision making and optimal resource allocation. Assessing the 
impact of an incident on the medical system presents a significant challenge for the 
authorities coordinating a response. The medical system has many agencies and facilities, 
and the staff members working in those facilities have their own individual opinions of 
how the system is affected. Someone needs to be able to get beyond anecdotal 
exhortations resulting from stress to make an assessment of a collection of information. 
                                                 
71 Natarajan, “National Imperative to Establish a Domestic Medical Intelligence Center.”  
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Ideally, this assessment should be applicable across the entire network so that the rolled-
up assessments are all founded on the same baseline and the compiled data is not simply 
an accumulation of dissimilar bits of data. 
One such system for quantifying the stress on the medical system is the 
Hospital Status Survey, or HOSS, developed by the Oklahoma City MMRS. The system 
is predicated on the assumption that a hospital’s level of stress can be determined by the 
internal actions taken by the facility in reaction to the external event. The hospitals 
answer a short series of questions from the MERC. The answers to the questions are 
assigned a numeric value. That value is compiled for the facility, and the collection of 
hospital scores is compiled for a system score. If the system seems to be headed into a 
stressed status, additional questions are asked in order to further drill down on the 
hospitals’ reaction. Table 20 shows the questions asked and the scoring format. If a 
particular facility receives a score close to a set threshold, the Oklahoma City MERC will 
call the facility to gather additional information. The system has the benefit of reminding 
facilities of potential actions they can take in response to an increase in patient volume. 
The HOSS also assures that the facilities have done all they can do internally before 
bringing in outside intervention. It is also a means of providing a quantified score that can 
be compared with other scores from MOCs across the network, thereby providing a 
consistent and valid assessment. 
Table 20.   Sample HOSS Form.  
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4. Communication Pathways  
Another critical function for every MOC is the establishment of pathways for 
communication flow. These pathways can be formal or informal, vertical or horizontal. 
Formal communications consist of prescribed and planned communication flow between 
facilities, the MOC, and the network. These are the hierarchical communications and 
reports in written, web-based, or verbal form that are planned, documented, and usually 
part of a command and control infrastructure. The informal communications occur 
between and among the medical system and the MOC network. These are the “off-line” 
discussions between interested parties who often have a preexisting relationship. This 
informal line of communication is far less hierarchical and often discouraged by those 
monitoring or in charge of the formal communication flow.  
Vertical communication is the two-way flow of information from the local agency 
to regional, state, or federal agencies and back down again. Horizontal flow is the 
communication flow between MOCs at the same level in the network or between two 
entities in close proximity to one another. The formal vertical flow of information is often 
pushed by planners and command staff and is most frequently found in response 
structures and networks; usually at the exclusion of other types of communication flows. 
The reason given is safety and control, but often the result is delayed decision making, 
incomplete information, and a partial operating picture. The MOC network needs to make 
full use of all the available communication flows in order to respond rapidly when needed 
and to ensure a complete picture of the situation. For example, Lawton, Oklahoma and 
Wichita Falls, Texas each have an MOC and are separated by twenty miles, a state line, 
and the Red River. Both MOC leaders established a relationship and opened lines of 
communication between the two centers—something discouraged by state response 
personnel. An incident at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma could produce multiple casualties. Instead of 
communicating with a hospital coordinating center twenty miles away, the Lawton MOC 
would have to contact Oklahoma City, who would contact Austin, who in turn would 
contact Dallas, who would then get the information from Wichita Falls. Then the 
information flow would have to return via the same circuitous route before one question 
could be answered, “Can I ship patients across the river to your hospital system?”  
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The NDMS system flooded the Little Rock hospital system with evacuees from 
hurricane Ike in 2008 to the point of collapsing the entire Little Rock hospital system. If 
Little Rock had had an MOC, and had established communications with Oklahoma City, 
Tulsa, and Memphis, perhaps this horizontal communication flow would have found 
solutions to Little Rock’s challenge and diffused the hospital system through patient 
transfers to those nearby systems. Once the MOC network is created, the various forms 
and levels of communication should be acknowledged and embraced. While a formal 
vertical network may necessarily be the primary pathway, the other, often more effective, 
communication relationships should not be ignored. 
5. Patient Distribution  
One function that seems relatively consistent among the current functioning 
MOCs is the ability to determine patient flow and destination. Normally, the local EMS 
service, utilizing existing protocols, determines the end destination of out-of-hospital 
patients as well as patient transfers. During a mass-casualty incident, disaster, or public-
health emergency, that decision process is often relegated to the MOC. The MOC has 
communication with each destination facility and can determine real-time capacity. That 
information is utilized to inform the transport officer at the scene of the ideal destination 
for a particular patient. Patient movement coordinated through the MOC is not restricted 
to a mass-casualty incident. In fewer than 12 hours, the Houston CMOC facilitated the 
movement of 500 LTC and hospital patients threatened by flooding from hurricane Ike in 
2008. 
6. Resource Coordination  
Another critical function that every MOC should be capable of performing is the 
task of coordinating resources for the medical system. When the formal (purchased 
inventory) and the informal (facilities borrowing from each other) inventory systems 
cannot meet the need of the facilities, then the MOC is the next point of contact for a 
facility. Depending on the need, the MOC will either find the needed items in another 
facility, another component of the medical system, available cache, or request the items 
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through the emergency management resource process. In a truly functioning national 
network, the MOC could also look outside its own jurisdiction for a needed item and 
contact a neighboring MOC within the network. The MOC should be responsible for 
following up on any valid request from the medical system and reporting the status of the 
request on a regular basis. During large-scale incidents, the MOC may act as the 
coordinating entity between the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) warehouse and the 
medical community that needs supplies from the SNS. To facilitate the resource-
coordination efforts, hospitals and other medical-system agencies and organizations 
should enter into a memorandum of understanding that provides the terms and processes 
for sharing available supplies and equipment. There should also be additional work done 
on typing medical equipment and supply resources as part of the National Incident 
Management System so that the MOC network can have a consistent and standardized 
idea of what is being requested and supplied. 
7. Response Solutions  
The last function of the MOCs in the network is the miscellaneous role of 
“problem solver” or problem resource. The MOC should be the one-stop location for 
significant needs from the medical community when the individual facility is no longer 
capable of meeting those needs. Sometimes the problems can be solved; sometimes it will 
not be resolved. But in order to build some of the perceived value and accompanying 
authority and participation from the medical system, the MOC should be willing to take 
on this chore in a controlled manner. The medical system must also realize, through 
MOC education and communication, the limits of the MOC. While the MOC will 
certainly attempt to solve problems, the medical system should not hold the MOC 
responsible for finding solutions to all problems. 
These seven key functions should be shared by all MOCs in the national network 
at all levels. Other functions may be provided by the MOC to meet the particular needs 
and unique characteristics of the local or regional medical system. By focusing overtly on 
the functions performed, the network can be constructed with the existing MOC, as well 
as new organizations willing to take on the role of medical system coordination. The 
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focus on function will mean that it will not matter which agency acts as the “champion” 
or provides space or oversight, as long as that agency can provide the functions 
mentioned above. 
D. SYSTEM DESIGN 
The first step in the system design will be to decide where to locate the MOCs in 
the network in order to provide the greatest coverage to the medical systems and 
population in the nation. Along with that decision, the federal government should 
determine whether any existing preparedness programs already exist that could assume 
this important project. I would posit that the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS) Program, currently under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS) 
makes an excellent match on several fronts. The 124 cities and jurisdictions of the 
MMRS cover the majority of the nation’s population and a significant number of the 
medical systems in the country. The original intent of the program was to fund a medical 
response mechanism in the nation’s metropolitan areas—where the vast majority of 
medical systems also exist. The MMRS program is also undergoing some suggested 
potential changes that will dovetail nicely into the establishment of a national network of 
MOCs: a risk formula based upon population, a nexus with emergency management, and 
an expansion to cover all fifty-six states and territories. Medical systems and population 
centers usually go hand in hand;: the MOC is an extension of the ESF-8 seats in an EOC 
and integrated with the rest of emergency management; the expanded coverage will 
incorporate all the medical systems in the nation. The current MOCs are frequently 
located in jurisdictions with an existing MMRS program. The MMRS program, with the 
MOC National Network Project could serve as a bridge between the medical programs in 
USDHS and those within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(USDHHS). Other funding programs, such as the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
under USDHS or the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 
program under USDHHS could also be used to support the formation of the MOC 
network. However, the MMRS program appears to have the best fit of mission and 
existing relationships with the metropolitan areas and medical system within those areas. 
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Once a basic map of the desired locations for an MOC has been identified, the 
current MOCs must be assessed for the functionalities listed above; areas without an 
MOC must be encouraged to establish a medical-system coordinating center. The process 
can be a top-down approach, a bottom-up approach, or a combination of the two. A top-
down approach would involve establishing the federal center, which can be the 
Operations Center at ASPR, then determining the role of the federal regional offices, 
which must possess the core functionalities of an MOC. The next steps include 
developing and identifying state MOCs and finally the various metropolitan MOCs to 
complete the network. The top-down method would be easier at first, since much of the 
work has been done, but this method would potentially delay the establishment of MOCs 
at the local and regional level—the ultimate source of the desired information for a 
national picture of what is occurring in the medical system.  
A bottom-up approach, on the other hand, would concentrate on getting the local 
and regional MOCs established first, then building the network at the state, regional, and 
federal level. While the bottom-up approach would form MOCs at the grass roots level, 
the lack of a state or regional center to which to report might inhibit the continued 
success of the local MOC. The state might not be interested in assisting, and the 
communication flow might necessarily bypass state officials and go directly to the 
regional or federal level—not a good proposition for continued state support.  
The most likely approach is probably a hybrid of the previous two approaches, 
where existing MOCs are incorporated into the development of a state MOC, while 
additional metropolitan areas come online with their own newly established MOC. 
Regardless of level, the MOC system will face certain common issues, such as 
geographic scope, location, funding, staffing, operational guidelines, and the use of 
technology. The medical operations center will also need an agreed name, so that 





1. Geographic Scope  
One of the first steps will be to determine the geographic area covered by an 
MOC. At the local level an MOC’s geographic area should mirror that of the medical 
system and will usually be regional. The medical system usually does not recognize the 
borders of individual cities or counties and is determined by population densities and the 
physical location of the major facilities. A “catchment area” or referral area can usually 
be defined by the individual facilities and can serve as the geographic boundaries for the 
MOC. In some heavily populated cities such as Houston, the catchment area involves so 
many facilities that one area may have to be subdivided into smaller subunits for realistic 
control. Large rural areas may not have any particular defined catchment area, but they 
may still have an MOC located in one of the larger cities in that rural area that covers 
numerous counties and the individual health facilities located in the those counties. 
The state MOC geographic area should be easily determined as the borders of any 
particular state. However, there may be alterations depending on the medical systems and 
their locations. Medical systems don’t always respect state boundaries either. The 
medical system in Kansas City, Kansas may be more effectively coordinated by the MOC 
in Kansas City, Missouri—a fact that alters the geographic coverage area of both states. 
The federal and regional areas are also already clearly defined and should remain 
consistent with their existing geographic boundaries. 
2. Location 
As long as the core functions are present, and those functions are known and 
accessible to the medical system, the actual physical location of the MOC is not 
prescribed. MOCs are currently located in 911 centers, emergency operations centers, 
hospitals, stand-alone locations, and combined with public-health operations centers. 
While an MOC can function in a variety of locations, certain considerations should come 
into play, particularly if the leaders of a medical system are embarking on the creation of 
an MOC. 
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The amount of space dedicated to performing the functions does matter. Most 
MOCs contacted during the research bemoaned the initial underestimation of space 
required for the center. Sometimes the amount of space was not negotiable: it was 
dictated by what was available. Anecdotal experience from some of the existing MOCs 
demonstrates that there should be enough space for fifteen to twenty people to operate 
comfortably for extended periods of time. 
Although the medical system is distinctly different from the public-health system, 
the two are inexorably linked in so many ways that the combination of public-health 
operations functionality and medical system functionality located in the same area was 
the preferred means expressed by those surveyed. This may not be possible for a number 
of reasons: politics, interagency competition, parochial protection of one’s “turf,” limits 
on existing space options, finances, or the space requirements required for both public-
health and medical system coordination. The number of people and the amount of space 
required to manage the logistic supply and operations of twenty mass prophylaxis 
locations, combined with the coordination needs of twenty overwhelmed hospitals and 
five very busy EMS agencies may exceed the space available. However, if it can be done, 
placing both functional areas under one roof is desirable and proves to be the best way to 
maintain an easy linkage between the two systems. 
Another location option is to locate the MOC with an existing emergency 
operations center (EOC). A large number of MOCs currently in operation have moved to 
an EOC, or they have developed inside an EOC as a means of increasing the space and 
activities formerly conducted by the two or three previous ESF-8 seats. Being located 
with an EOC has the distinct advantage of providing immediate assessments of the 
impact on the medical system to the policy group, obtaining and relaying incident 
situational awareness to the medical system, and having a means readily at hand to obtain 
needed resources. The EOC co-location may also help defuse some concerns from 
emergency managers about the MOC’s being a duplicate coordination entity. One 




with multiple local EOCs that have hospitals or clinics in their jurisdiction. Ideally, the 
MOC would be located in a regional EOC whose coverage area matches that of the 
medical system covered by the MOC. 
Placing the MOC within an existing 911 center has been chosen as an option by 
several jurisdictions. This option allows for rapid interaction between the field medical 
units and the MOC. There is a significant caveat to placing the MOC within the 911 
center, however: consoles, and the use of existing personnel for staffing. Most 911 
centers in large metropolitan areas utilize computer-aided dispatch (CAD). The personnel 
sit at consoles, or stations, while performing their duty. This design, while quite efficient 
for daily operations, does not readily allow for rapid expansion of personnel assisting 
during a disaster. Any available console and/or personnel may be tied up answering the 
flood of 911 calls for assistance or dispatching units at the expense of system 
coordination. There must be clearly dedicated space and staff to perform the coordination 
function. The MOC established inside a 911 center may have been established to 
coordinate a segment of the medical system during a sudden mass-casualty incident, and 
it may not be designed to coordinate the complex medical-system needs of a widespread, 
slowly evolving, long-term incident that taxes the entire medical system. 
A hospital may be an option for the location of an MOC. Hospitals frequently 
have the space needed and often can provide the necessary technical and administrative 
support. Hospital staff can also provide either initial or back-up staffing for an MOC. The 
hospital as a location may present a challenge if the hospital system is competitive; some 
hospitals may refuse to participate, fearing unfair treatment from the center. The MOC 
inside a hospital would also be dependent on the support of the facility’s 
administration—sometimes a fleeting prospect. 
A final consideration when choosing a location for the MOC is the dual use of an 
existing space. The medical system is replete with entities that either perform as a referral 
center, such as a trauma call center, or provide clinical expertise, such as a poison control 
center. These call centers already have much of what is needed in an MOC: space, 
technology, and personnel. Existing call centers may be able to provide sudden on-call 
medical-system coordination for short periods with their existing personnel. This method 
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can allow an MOC to get up and running quickly, but eventually the call center will need 
to go back to providing the service for which it was initially designed.  
Even if the call center’s dual use does not work out, there is also the option of 
using existing space whose initial purpose can be delayed or moved to a different location 
if the MOC needs to be operational for an extended period of time. The Oklahoma City 
MERC started out sharing space with an EMS training room. The Tulsa MERC’s initial 
location was a police briefing room. The space can be wired with the needed technology 
and can be rapidly converted to an MOC should the need arise. Regardless of how it is 
done, the dual use of existing space can significantly reduce the initial cost of 
establishing an MOC—an important consideration. 
3. Costs and Funding 
The initial development and sustained operating costs are critical considerations 
for any new endeavor, and the establishment of a local or regional MOC is no different. 
A medical operations center can be developed for a relatively modest cost, particularly 
when that cost is weighed against the benefits to the medical system of situational 
awareness, appropriate patient destination, and effective utilization of resources. Several 
strategies can be employed to reduce or mitigate the costs of establishing a medical 
operations center: dual use, on-call escalating status, grant funding, and either municipal 
or health-care system support. 
Dual use of existing facilities has been discussed earlier. By sharing existing 
space, the costs for the space and the personnel can be absorbed or shared by another 
functioning entity, such as a trauma call center or a poison control center. The net cost for 
performing the functions of a medical operations center theoretically can be incorporated 
into the cost of that alternate function. This may prove impractical if the two functions 
need to operate simultaneously. However, sharing mutually exclusive space such as a 
lecture hall or a training room may assist in reducing the overall cost of the MOC. 
Developing an on-call and escalating operating structure for the MOC may also 
result in cost savings. The MOC remains in a stand-by mode and is activated during an 
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incident that requires coordination of the medical system. Once activated, a small number 
of personnel respond to staff the MOC, assess the situation, and determine additional 
staffing needs. This approach will save on any expenses associated with personnel 
required to operate the MOC, but it runs the risks of being slow to respond and of not 
having enough personnel present to meet the needs of the system during the early period 
of an incident. 
Numerous grant programs are available to assist with the formation and operation 
of an MOC. The MOC can be considered a means to address important components of 
several national priorities72. The costs of establishing and operating an MOC should be 
easily justifiable under the many grant programs provided by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services73 and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security74. Some of 
the federal grant programs currently available to fund part or all of the MOC costs are 
given below. 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) 
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP) 
State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention program (LETPP) 
Citizens Corps Program (CCP) 
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) 
Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP) 
Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
                                                 
72 United States Department of Homeland Security, “National Preparedness Guidelines.”  
73 United States Department of Health and Human Services, “The Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP).” 
74 United States Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2009 Homeland Security Grant Overview.” 
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Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
National Association of City and County Health Officials (NACCHO) 
Operation Stonegarden Grant Program (OSPG) 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) 
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) 
Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) 
These federal grant programs, along with numerous other non-federal community 
endowment and grant programs, afford many opportunities to fund the establishment of 
an MOC. 
Oklahoma City established its MOC in 1999 at an initial startup cost of $30,000 
funded from the MMRS grant program. The initial MOC, locally called the MERC, was 
established in the training room at the EMS headquarters. The funding was used to 
purchase computers, phones, furniture, radios, and communication lines for 25 positions. 
If needed, the dual-use room could be rapidly converted to a functioning MOC in about 
15 minutes. 
Municipal and state governments may also contribute to the costs of establishing 
an MOC. Once the benefit to the community and the means of obtaining situational 
awareness is revealed, many jurisdictions will provide the space and equipment in order 
to have the MOC located within the local or regional emergency operations centers. 
Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Lawton, San Antonio, Houston, and a host of other jurisdictions, 
have all provided space for and incorporated the MOC into the operations of their 
emergency operations centers. 
The medical community can be another source for funding or a means to offset 
expenses for the MOC. A medical facility or organization can contribute to the MOC in 
many ways: funding equipment, providing space, and facilitating developmental and 
operational planning meetings. A component of the medical system may also be 
operating a call center or some other coordination entity and may be willing to absorb the 
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additional costs associated with performing the core functions of an MOC. Once the 
medical system understands the value that an MOC can provide, it will have a vested 
interest in ensuring the MOC’s continued operation.  
4. Staffing  
The medical system can also provide one of the most valuable and expensive 
components of operating an MOC—staffing. One of the most difficult challenges faced 
by developers of an MOC is the identification and training of individuals who will staff 
the MOC during operations. One of the very reasons for creating an MOC is to expand 
the operational capacity to manage the myriad of agencies and entities that compose the 
medical system—hence the need for an adequate number of personnel on hand when the 
MOC is up and running. The number needed will depend upon the size and scope of the 
incident and the number of agencies and organizations involved.  
At the local, regional, or state level, it will likely be cost prohibitive to maintain 
dedicated staffing for an MOC; the staffing will likely have to come from somewhere 
else. If the MOC is located within a staffed entity, such as a trauma call center, the 
staffing present may be adequate for the initial response; the individuals present will just 
shift their collective duties to that of the MOC. The organization that hosts the MOC may 
have personnel that are dual tasked and can respond to the MOC once the need for 
activation becomes apparent. Many MOCs are not staffed on a routine basis and require 
either staffing for the initial response or augmentation staffing for an extended operation.  
The medical system can provide the additional personnel for the MOC operation. 
It may also be in a medical organization’s best interest to assign staff to operate the 
MOC. This would provide an individual on the insideto ensure that the parent 
organization receives the information it needs. Operating the MOC with donated or 
volunteer staffing incurs the risk of not having trained staff available when needed. Faced 
with a disaster, the medical organization may withhold the promised staff or send other 
individuals less trained and experienced. Scheduled volunteers may not arrive. A long 
operation may create a fatigue that erodes the support and availability of outside staffing.  
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In any of these cases, the effectiveness of the MOC may be impeded, to the 
detriment of the entire medical system. Those responsible for scheduling on-call or 
reassigned staffing should err in favor of higher numbers to account for possible no-
shows. Not only does the MOC require an adequate number of staff, but those working in 
the MOC also need to be trained and familiar with its internal operations and with the 
external response plan for the medical system. 
5. Planning and Operational Guidelines  
While the capability to perform a standardized set of internal functions, as 
mentioned earlier, is important to achieve some degree of consistency within the system, 
the MOC network will need to have some degree of common operating definition of the 
external environment as well. Once this has been established by convention or regulation, 
a set of parameters will exist that will allow an individual MOC to operate in the manner 
required to meet the needs of the region or state while still performing in a manner 
consistent enough to facilitate the flow of information throughout the levels of the 
network. This common operating definition also provides a core section of the training 
provided to those individuals working within an MOC during a mass-casualty incident or 
public-health emergency. Not only is such an individual dealing with local or state needs, 
he or she must also have a conceptual idea of what is occurring at all levels of the 
network. 
At the micro level, there are two specific understandings or definitions that should 
be consistent throughout the network: the minimal elements of the medical systems 
whose activities will be coordinated, and the minimal set of information that will be 
requested and provided through the network. At the macro level, the external 
environment should be consistently defined in both a vertical and horizontal manner. 
Because some MOCs may currently exist to coordinate a hospital system only, the 
minimal medical-system components should be clarified and defined so that a baseline 
level of monitoring, coordination, and information exists throughout the entire network. 
While any agency, organization, facility, business, or individual whose endeavors pertain 
to a patient’s individual care can and should be coordinated, there is a critical core of 
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medical-system elements that should be addressed by every MOC. These elements can 
be, and most likely will need to be, expanded based upon the incident, but for the sake of 
consistency, each local or regional MOC should interact with the following providers of 
patient care: 
Hospitals and health-care organizations (HCO); 
Emergency medical service agencies; 
Long-term care facilities (LTC); 
Pharmacies; 
Large stand-alone clinics and federally qualified health centers (FQHC); 
Public-health departments (if the MOC is not operated by a public-health agency). 
This list should not be construed as being the only medical-system components 
coordinated by the MOC; rather, it represents the minimal set of patient-care providers 
that require constant MOC interaction. The MOC will still need to coordinate with other 
agencies, such as public safety and emergency management outside the medical system. 
Other medical-system components may rise to critical importance depending upon the 
type of incident and the affected population. 
The standard template for information requests, once defined, allows each local 
and regional MOC to immediately gather a particular set of information and forward that 
information up to the state MOC for collation. The medical-system organizations can be 
trained to provide that information immediately upon MOC activation. State and federal 
agencies thus would have a consistent and rapidly collected data set that provides the 
initial medical-system assessments to be analyzed for the initial situational update. This 
standard template should only include information needs required for all medical-system 
responses regardless of nature and etiology. The information request should be derived 
after input from all stakeholders in the medical system and should consider the amount of 
effort required of the facility or organization providing the information. The requests 
should be simple and clearly understood; requiring explanation will either delay delivery 
of the information or produce inconsistent and questionable results. It may be better to 
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ask a hospital the anticipated number and type of ventilators that may need to be supplied 
from the outside, rather than requiring a total inventory of every ventilator—a number 
that will be outdated before it reaches its end destination. The information requested 
should be quantifiable, similar to the HOSS example provided above. 
Such an information template currently exists. The USDHHS routinely requires a 
select amount of information through its HaVBED reporting system. Recently, in 
anticipation that the H1N1 pandemic could create system problems, the HaVBED system 
reporting requirements were significantly expanded, without any serious consultation 
with the end providers or state health agencies.75 This “top down” approach, combined 
with the lack of an MOC network for collection and collation, has resulted in a hardship 
on the end provider, a low level of compliance, subjective data that may not be 
comparable from one region to the next, and difficulty for the states in collecting 
additional information they may feel is important for the management of the medical 
system during the pandemic. 
Fortunately, a definition of the external vertical segmentation currently exists and 
is in widespread use in the medical-planning and response community. The Medical 
Surge Capacity and Capability Project (MSCC) provides a description of the vertical 
integration of the medical system during a complex medical or public-health response. 
The goal of the project is to “develop a management system (framework) that promotes 
public health and medical system resiliency and maximizes the ability to provide 
adequate public health and medical services during events that exceed the normal medical 
capacity and capability of an affected community.76 Key components of the system 
include: 
• Defining a system that includes management of local, state, tribal, and 
federal medical response to provide optimal surge capacity and capability, 
while protecting health-care staff, current patients, and the health-care 
system integrity; 
                                                 
75 United States Department of Health and Human Services, “HaVBED Users Guide (DRAFT).” 
76 United States Department of Health and Human Services. Medical Surge Capacity and Capability. 
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• Defining the management relationship between health care organizations 
and provider, and the multiple levels of government response; 
• Establishing incident-planning processes and information management to 
promote an integrated medical response that is timely and accurate; 
• Incorporating incident command system principles to facilitate medical-
system integration with non-medical incident management during 
response, and to establish acute-care medicine as “first responders” in the 
emergency-response community. Providing a platform for effective 
training of medical incident management and response, from the local to 
the federal response levels.77 
The MSCC focuses on the integration of existing programs for incident 
management used by the medical system and calls for an emphasis on specific 
functionalities in order to provide a “systematic approach to organize and coordinate 
available public health and medical resources so they perform optimally under the stress 
of an emergency or disaster.”78 
The MSCC vertically segments the medical system response into six levels, 
starting with the individual health-care organization and ending with the overall federal 
response. These levels of response correlate nicely with the proposed MOC network. 
An excellent example of the horizontal segmentation of the medical system and 
its relationship with public-health activities and other supportive response agencies can 
be found in the Medical and Health Incident Management System (MaHIM) authored by 
Drs. Barbera and Macintyre in December of 2002.79 The MaHIM system utilizes an 
incident command system–based structure to organize response activities based upon 
select functional areas. The system also incorporates both public-health activities as well 
as those required of the medical system. The operational section of the system breaks 
these activities into six key areas: 
                                                 
77 United States Department of Health and Human Services. Medical Surge Capacity and Capability. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Barbera and Macintyre, Medical and Health Incident Management (MaHIM) System.  
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• Incident epidemiological profiling; 
• Pre-hospital care; 
• Medical care;  
• Mental health; 
• Hazard/threat/disease containment; 
• Mass fatality. 80 
 
Figure 5.   Proposed Network of MOCS Aligned with Medical System Response 
                                                 
80 Barbera and Macintyre, Medical and Health Incident Management (MaHIM) System. 
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Of these six areas, two—epidemiological profiling and disease containment—can 
be considered public-health activities. Two others—pre-hospital care and medical care—
are clearly medical-system activities. The remaining two—mental health and mass 
fatality—can be performed by either the public-health or the medical system. The authors 
of the MaHIM system recognized the distinct differences between medical and public-
health systems as well as their intertwined relationships. 
Each one of the functional areas is broken down further to a list of subfunctions. 
For example, the medical care functional area is broken down into the following sub-
functional areas: 
• Acute medical care (the traditional evaluation and treatment 
capabilities for injury and illness); 
o Out-of-hospital care (outpatient services, physician offices, and 
other practitioners of health care); 
o Emergency and hospitalized care (emergency department and 
hospital care). 
• Post acute medical care (chronic and long-term care, rehabilitation 
services, home health care, special-needs patients); 
• Patient diagnostics (laboratories, radiology); 
• Medical evacuation and inter-facility transport (ground, rotary, and 
fixed-wing transport services). 81 
By determining which agencies and organizations perform these patient-care-
related functions within a region, the MOC can identify the horizontal matrix of the 
agencies and organizations that will need coordination during a mass-casualty incident or 
public-health emergency. 
The MaHIM system also identifies the non-medical agencies and organizations, 
by function, with which an MOC will need to coordinate in order to accomplish an 
effective medical response. These include the following organizations: 
 
                                                 
81 Barbera and Macintyre, Medical and Health Incident Management (MaHIM) System. 
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• Fire suppression; 
• Scene security/perimeter control; 
• Search and rescue; 
• Traffic control; 
• Hazardous material response; 
• Law enforcement; 
• Mass evacuation;  
• Public works and engineering. 
The MOC will likely work through the local, regional, or state emergency 
management agencies, emergency operations centers, or scene-based incident command 
systems in order to have these functions performed in support of a medical response, but 
there may be times where there is direct communication and coordination between an 
agency performing the function and the MOC. 
6. Information Management Network  
The MOC system has been described in terms of functional areas of operation as 
well as the vertical and horizontal stratification of the agencies and organizations 
involved in a medical response. An effective information-management system is required 
to link those disparate components together in order to facilitate an effective response. 
This system will oversee the acquisition, analysis, formatting, and distribution of 
information in support of the operations section of the MOC as well as the various 
agencies involved in the response. 
The authors of the MaHIM system provide both insight and an innovative 
approach to the information-management needs of a medical-response structure. The 
MaHIM system structure provides for a medical local information function in the 
planning section. This function “establishes overall coordination of information by 
specifying the data to report, and establishing reporting requirements such as formatting, 
timing, and methodologies.” 82 As noted earlier, these templates and reporting 
                                                 
82 Barbera and Macintyre, Medical and Health Incident Management (MaHIM) System. 
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requirements need to be determined before a communication network is established; they 
should drive the design and selection of the communication technologies. Too often, a 
type of technology, in the form of a radio system, satellite system, or incident 
management software, will already be in place prior to the building of the network. There 
will be an attempt to utilize the systems that already exist, regardless of capability or 
initial design intent in order to justify the expense of the software program. The result is 
often an attempt to drive a square peg of need into a round hole of capability with the end 
product questionable in usefulness and validity.83 The jurisdiction or agency taking this 
approach may have little choice due to time or fiscal realities. However, whenever 
possible, the approach should always be to determine the information management needs 
first, and then procure the necessary technology to respond to those needs.  
This is even more critical when building a network of MOCs; the information-
management processes and linkage between the various MOCs at different levels is the 
gluethat holds the network together. The necessary time and funding should be 
appropriated to ensure that information management is robust, consistent, and 
transferable between the various components of the MOC network.  
7. What is in a Name? 
There are several MOCs in the nation operating under different names. Table 21 
shows some of the names of these MOCs: 
 
Table 21.   Current MOC Names. 
Selection of Current Names for a Medical Operations Center Currently in Use 
Medical Operations Center Medical Emergency Resource Center 
Regional Medical Operations Center Regional Health Information Center 
Medical Information Center Catastrophic Medical Operations Center 
Medical Emergency Response Center Medical Emergency Operations Center 
Medical Resource Control Center Emergency Care Control Center 
                                                 
83 An example of this phenomenon is the current HaVBED requests being processed through a 
notification and resource management software program called EMResource. The software program is in 
wide use by public health and medical system agencies and organizations. However, the HaVBED report 
requires thirty-two data points, while EMResource can only manage twenty data points in a single report. 
Consequently, hospitals have to fill out two separate questionnaires in order to generate one report.  
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While it would be inherently unfair and realistically impossible to call for a 
specific name change for all of the MOCs, there should be agreement on the name of the 
entity that performs the functions of medical-system coordination. I have used the term 
medical operations center in this thesis to describe that function, and I feel that this term 
best meets the needs for a standardized descriptive name. Anecdotally, the term medical 
operations center also seems to be working its way into the vernacular of the emergency-
response community. Each MOC can adopt or keep whatever official name it desires, but 
the overall name for the entity would be an MOC. This seemingly trivial differentiation 
may prove important during a response. Federal, military, or state EMAC medical teams 
coming into an area will need to obtain medical intelligence and establish their presence 
within the medical response infrastructure. They will need to seek out the MOC, and 
would be better served if they could request the location and contact information for an 
entity with a standardized name, rather than trying to describe the functions of the MOC 
or figure out the local or regional name for the entity. 
E. WHAT THE NETWORK WILL LOOK LIKE  
A visual depiction of the MOC network will assist in understanding what is 
needed to facilitate a medical response to a large-scale incident or catastrophe in this 
country. I have outlined the need for a functions-based network, described the vertical 
and horizontal segmentation of the system and how the network relates, and discussed the 
need for a robust information management system to tie the network together. The 
following schematics will provide another way to demonstrate how the system could be 
built. 
1. The Regional MOC  
This is the basic building unit of the national network. Even though there may be 
political or other pressures to keep the MOC in a particular jurisdiction, the MOC should 
be regional and match the geographic scope of the existing medical system. The regional 
MOC may perform both public-health and medical system response functions, or may 
have to liaison with a public-health agency’s coordination center if such an entity exists. 
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The regional MOC will also have to perform a liaison function with at least one 
emergency operations center, and likely several. The informal communication pathway 
between this regional MOC and another located elsewhere in the state is also depicted. 
 
 
Figure 6.   The Regional MOC 
 
2. The State-Level MOC 
The state MOC serves as a critical link in the MOC network and must perform 
two important functions during a large medical response affecting the state. The state 
MOC must interact with the regional MOCs that have been activated and coordinate a 




Figure 7.   The State-Level MOC 
 
The state MOC must also act as a conduit of information between the federal and 
regional coordination entities. The state MOC will likely also be required to coordinate 
public-health activities occurring within the medical-system response. The state MOC 
will have a direct relationship and a communications pathway with each of the activated 
regional MOCs. There will also be a direct relationship with either a national or a federal 
regional MOC, depending on how the federal part of the national network has been 
structured. The dotted lines on the diagram depict either the informal or formal 
communication pathways between each of the individual regional MOCs. The state MOC 
must recognize and accept these communication pathways, while the regional MOCs 
must recognize, accept, and facilitate the state MOC’s need to be the centralized hub for 
information should a disaster involve multiple regions in the state. 
3. The Federal MOC and the Overall National Network 
The last level of the network consists of the federal components that will be 
placed into operation during a mass casualty or public-health emergency. The federal 
government, namely USHHS, will need to decide whether it wants to coordinate from 
one centralized coordination center or to employ the use of a regional MOC in each of the 
federal regions. Currently, the coordination effort is performed at the Assistant Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (ASPR) Operational Center, located in Washington, D.C. 
This center is part of the Emergency Care Coordination Center established in response to 
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HSPD-21.84 If the MOC network is completed to its fullest extent, the ASPR Operations 
Center will need to coordinate the activities of between fifty to fifty-six state and 
territorial MOCs. This may present a span of control issues during a significant national 
emergency such as a virulent pandemic. The ASPR Operations Center in Washington, 
D.C. would need to ensure that space and staff were available to address the significant 
level of information management that would be required during such an event. 
Another option would be to establish a federal MOC in each of the ten federal 
regions in the nation. Each state MOC would coordinate with the federal regional MOC 
in the region, and each federal regional MOC would, in turn, interface with the ASPR 
Operations Center in Washington, D.C. While this would certainly address the span-of-
control challenge, it would also add additional cost to the network and would insert 
another level of complexity and bureaucracy to the management of information, 
command, and control. The decision on which model to adopt will need to be made by 
the leadership at USHHS, but I favor a single robust and capable ASPR Operations 
Center in Washington with internal sections for each federal region. The network needs 
to be as lean and efficient as possible to facilitate the rapid analysis and distribution of 
information; adding another level of complexity could create a potential bottleneck for 
the information flow.  
Figure 8 presents the national MOC network in schematic form. Each regional 
MOC coordinates with its respective state MOC. There is also an informal 
communications pathway between and among the regional MOCs represented by the 
dashed lines. Each state MOC in turn either coordinates with the federal regional MOC, if 
that option is chosen by USHHS, or directly with the ASPR Operations Center in 
Washington, D.C. Like the regional MOCs, there will likely be an informal 
communications pathway between State MOCs, identified by the dashed lines. In total, 
one hundred fifty to two hundred regional MOCs will coordinate with fifty to fifty-six 
state and territorial MOCs. Those state and territorial MOCs will either coordinate with 
ten federal regional MOCs or with one large federal MOC located in Washington, D.C. 
                                                 
84 United States Department of Health and Human Services, “Emergency Care Coordination Center.” 
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The network allows for an effective two-way management of information at all levels of 
response during a disaster or public-health emergency. 
 
Figure 8.   The National MOC Network 
 
The national network of medical operations centers not only can be built, but it 
should be built. Many MOCs currently exist, and many more are likely to follow; the 
capabilities of each would be greatly expanded if they were formed into a cohesive 
network. A comprehensive means of gathering and disseminating critical medical-system 
information could be done relatively easily with the right leadership, authorities, and 
consistent functionalities. The MMRS program, or even the UASI and/or ASPR Grants 
offer already functioning programs that could oversee and coordinate the development of 
an MOC national network. An MOC could be established with a minimal amount of 
funding and could be staffed and operated in a cost-efficient manner. 
This spring, the United States was faced with the first pandemic of this century 
when the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus appeared. The operational MOCs in the country 
went to work and coordinated the medical-system response. Hospital capacities were 
monitored, PPE and other resources were distributed, and critical information was 
relayed from public-health authorities. 
The nation faces another wave of the pandemic this fall and winter combined with 
the annual seasonal influenza. Medical-response agencies and organizations are gearing 
up to weather the gathering storm. In order to achieve a greater situational awareness 
during this period, USDHHS has significantly expanded the data elements that hospitals 
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are required to report to the HaVBED system. This sudden expansion has created some 
difficulty for the hospitals regarding the processes for reporting. So far, hospital 
compliance has been haphazard, and the information obtained has been spotty at best. 
While the HaVBED system may eventually succeed in obtaining the needed information, 
a functioning medical operations center network would be able to provide both the state 
and federal government with any information needs that might present during the course 
of the pandemic. It may too late for the network to be built in time to affect the current 
pandemic response, but if the federal government, the states, and local jurisdictions start 
now, perhaps we can have a functioning network in time for the next widespread disaster, 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Four years after Alan Paxton lay untreated in one hospital while a nearby center 
remained underutilized, another large tornado once again struck Oklahoma City. On May 
9, 2003, experienced storm chasers following the nighttime tornado reported a large 
funnel cloud passing through densely populated neighborhoods and striking two large 
hospitals. The public-safety response was massive, expecting the levels of damage, 
injury, and death experienced in 1999. The Oklahoma City Medical Emergency Response 
Center (MERC), already activated with the approach of the storm, immediately checked 
the status of the two affected hospitals and began collating reports of EMS volume and 
the number of patients referring into the emergency departments of the hospital system. 
The affected hospitals reported minor damage: the loss of air conditioning at one 
location, minor roof damage at another. Both hospitals remained functioning. The 
emergency departments in the system were not seeing an influx of tornado victims. 
Relatively few EMS calls were being dispatched for tornado-related injuries. The 
information collated by the MERC was shared with the incident command structure and 
public-safety resources assigned to the incident were significantly reduced and/or 
released. The next morning revealed small and isolated areas of damage. The tornado had 
been large and powerful, but the damaging winds had not gone down to ground level 
until the storm was well past the metropolitan area. 
The MERC’s actions showed the value of a medical operations center’s ability to 
quickly assess the medical system and provide rapid and reliable information to the 
response infrastructure. This processed and analyzed intelligence can prove quite 
valuable to decision makers during a disaster or terrorism event. 
The summary of this thesis is organized around five core themes: the need for 
medical operations centers, the separate but linked medical and public-health systems, the 
need for collaboration and incident management, challenges and solutions, and the need 
to tie all the current and new centers coming online into a national network. 
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1. The medical system is a complex network of agencies and organizations 
that would be better served by a medical operations center to facilitate coordination and 
information flow during a mass-casualty incident or pubic health emergency.  
The medical system provides a cradle-to-grave continuum of care for individuals, 
beginning with prenatal care and concluding with hospice care for the terminally ill. 
Included in this continuum are hospitals, EMS agencies, outpatient clinics, dialysis 
centers, physicians’ offices, pharmacies, rehabilitation centers, mental-health clinics, 
hospices, and medical-equipment suppliers. These different organizations work together 
in a complex networked system of competition, regulation, third-party payment, cost 
shifting, and economic uncertainty. Most of the system is privatized and outside the 
public domain. Yet it is this system that is called upon to address the most critical 
element of a natural disaster or terrorist attack: reducing the mortality and morbidity of 
the affected population. 
Medical providers are heavily dependent on infrastructure, technology, and 
personnel. The medical system, through decades of cost-containment strategies, has 
eliminated most of its excess capacity in the name of efficiency. The medical system does 
have the capability to adapt to changes in the external environment from regulation, 
payment changes, and technological and clinical advances, but this adaptation is slow. A 
sudden surge in patients from a mass-casualty incident or the degradation of the 
supporting infrastructure will require a medical operations center to effectively 
coordinate the necessary resources, information, and personnel. This will not only 
optimize the utilization of the medical system in the response phase but ensure its 
survival and availability to the community after the incident. 
2. The medical system is markedly different from the public-health system, 
but the two are not mutually exclusive, and they combine to form the overall health-care 
response to the community during a disaster or public-health emergency.  
As noted earlier, both the focus groups and the survey demonstrated that there is a 
clear distinction and difference between the medical system and the public-health system. 
This difference is also delineated in HSPD-21 and other recent documents. The medical 
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system focuses its attention on individual care, while the primary focus of the public-
health system is the overall health of the community. Medical-system providers often 
have to make decisions and act upon partial information and an incomplete picture. 
Public-health providers prefer to obtain as complete a picture as possible before acting—
a necessary approach when the recommendations and actions have significant 
ramifications for a large number of people. 
Although the two systems are different, they cannot and do not operate in separate 
silos. Medical-system providers routinely perform public-health functions, such as 
syndromic surveillance and infectious-disease intervention. Likewise, the public-health 
community engages in individual care through monitoring infectious patients and 
providing guidance to clinical providers. Each component in each system usually 
performs at least some function of the other. The difference lies in the priority, scope, and 
decision process. Although the focus groups and survey participants felt strongly that the 
systems were indeed different, they opposed just as strongly the separation of ESF-8 into 
two separate functions. As one participant put it, “They are different systems, but they are 
both under the umbrella of health care.” 
3. Regional planning, collaboration, and an effective incident-management 
system needs to accompany the development of a medical operations center in order to 
effectively respond to any incident that creates a large number of ill or injured. 
The medical operations center cannot operate in a vacuum. In order to be 
successful, the formation of a center must be accompanied by local and regional planning 
with all the stakeholders present. Preferably a neutral entity will bring together key 
agencies and individuals to identify gaps and arrive at mutually agreed-upon solutions. 
There must be an effective incident-management system, such as the MaHIM system 
developed by Drs. Barbera and Macintyre. This system will need to be ingrained in both 
the medical and public-health systems and then exercised on a regular basis. In order to 
foster the effective collaboration needed for the development of a medical operations 
center, there must be identified funding sources, a clearly stated purpose and mission, 
buy-in from hospital executives and agency heads, and value perceived by participating 
organizations. 
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4. Challenges to creating a medical operations center are numerous, but can 
be overcome through the application of funding, collaboration, and the provision of 
added value to the stakeholders. 
The focus groups and survey responses revealed that numerous obstacles exist to 
the creation of a medical operations center. These obstacles include a lack of funding, 
lack of space, competing city and regional priorities, a perception of duplication by 
emergency management, lack of statutory ordinance or authority, and lack of a clear 
organization to oversee the center. While some of these challenges are certainly difficult, 
they are not without solutions.  
Funding for the initial costs of a medical operations center can be found from 
numerous USDHS and USDHHS grant programs. These programs include the MMRS 
program, UASI, ASPR, and CDC, as well as specific funding programs for EOC 
operations. A case can be made that the centers will facilitate interoperable 
communications within the medical community. Once the value of the centers is 
demonstrated to the medical and public-safety community, sustainment sources may be 
easier to identify. Medical operations centers can exist anywhere that there is space. 
Location within an EOC is favorable, but that may not be an initial option. The hospital 
system may be able to find space, or the functions of an MOC can be incorporated into an 
existing structure such as a medical call center. Once the value of the center is 
demonstrated, space will likely become available.  
The perception of duplication by emergency managers can be overcome through 
education and the practical demonstration that the MOC is there to augment, not replace, 
an EOC. Clear authorities are not necessary if a facilitative approach is taken and can be 
created or identified should they become necessary. Any number of organizations can 
oversee the MOC. With a true collaborative effort the oversight function becomes one of 
administration, while the medical community, through regional planning and the 
provision of staffing, actually operates the center to meet its needs. 
5. Medical operations centers at the local, regional, and state level continue 
to be developed in numerous jurisdictions across the country. A minimal level of 
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consistent functionality and a national framework must be established to facilitate the 
optimal coordination and information flow at the local, state, and national level. 
An opportunity currently exists to establish a national system of medical 
operations centers at the local, regional, state, and national level. Many jurisdictions 
around the country have recognized the need for medical-system coordination and have 
taken active steps towards the creation of a medical operations center. The four centers 
presented in this thesis are representative examples, used to highlight some of the 
different approaches and challenges to establishing an MOC. There are many different 
variations of centers currently underway. Based upon the research, the MOC should be 
operated together with any public-health operations center. The MOC should also be 
located within an EOC. These ideal situations are not always possible for many reasons 
so there cannot be a cookie-cutter standardized layout for any particular jurisdiction. 
Each jurisdiction or region must take into account its own needs, challenges, and 
solutions in developing an MOC. 
What can be standardized is the funding, core functionality, and connectivity of 
the medical operations centers, and the establishment of a national network of the centers 
at the regional, state, and local level. Homeland Security and Health Preparedness 
funding can be specifically targeted towards the creation of MOCs through the country. 
Along with the funding, USDHS and USDHHS can establish the core functions needed 
for a large-scale event. These functions might include situational awareness, medical 
intelligence, communications, and resource prioritization. Many of these functions 
already exist in grant requirements, just not in the context of a medical operations center.  
Several states have already established a network of medical and public-health 
operations centers within their own borders. These individual networks can be connected 
both vertically and horizontally to form a national infrastructure of medical system 
coordination and communication that stretches across the various MSCC tiers. The 
example provided demonstrates how USDHS and USDHHS would have a structure to 
roll up information from the various states into a common operating picture. The federal 
government would also have a means of sending information and intelligence 
downstream, being assured that it would reach the local and regional level. The 
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horizontal connectivity may be controversial and appear to subvert established 
authoritarian lines, but this will likely happen spontaneously. Horizontal connectivity will 
also build in a degree of redundancy and security by forming a leaderless organization 
that can still function and obtain information should the main connecting node fail. 
Prescribed vertical communications can still be required, but horizontal communication 
should be encouraged. 
A key to establishing this network will be constant awareness of the nature of the 
medical system at the local and regional levels. The system is stressed, complicated, and 
comprised of many moving parts. The system is also keenly aware of its role in homeland 
security and offers significant resources to address coordination. Any successful system 
will need to provide value to both local/regional jurisdictions and the local/regional 
medical system. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Since the concept of a medical operations center is a relatively new construct for 
emergency planners, and a national network of such centers has not been discussed in the 
literature, a significant amount of academic research still needs to be done. First, a more 
complete inventory should be conducted on current medical operations centers currently 
and their methods of operation. Since the research for this thesis involved focus groups 
from jurisdictions with an MOC in place, the same type of research should be conducted 
in jurisdictions without an operating MOC. Research needs to be conducted on the 
subject from the public-health point of view.  
There must be additional research on the dichotomy and necessary integration 
strategies between the public-health and medical systems since they are markedly 
different, but there is a preference to keep the medical system and public-health 
coordinating activities together. There is a need for additional empirically based 
retrospective reviews of past disasters and public-health emergencies from the 
prespective of medical-system coordination. Lastly, the ESF-8 criteria need to be 
examined further to determine whether they meet the needs of the medical system, the 
public-health system, and the medical special-needs patients.  
 122





















LIST OF REFERENCES 
American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging. “Aging Services: The 
Facts.” http://www.aahsa.org/aging_services/default.asp [last accessed September 
10, 2008]. 
American Hospital Association. “Fast Facts on Hospitals.” Updated November 7, 2008. 
http://www.aha.org/aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/fast-facts.html [last 
accessed January 9, 2009]. 
———. “Hospital Facts to Know.” http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2008/pdf/08-issue-
facts-to-know-.pdf (last accessed July 15, 2008). 
American Medical Association. “AMA Physician Masterfile.” www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2673.html (last accessed January 6, 2009). 
American Osteopathic Association. “Osteopathic Medical Profession Report.” 
www.osteopathic.org/index.cfm?PageID_ompreport_healthcare (last accessed 
January 6, 2009). 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials. “A Summary of Four After-Action 
Reports on Hurricane Katrina.” 
http://www.astho.org/pubs/KatrinaReportsSummary.pdf [last accessed March 2, 
2008]. 
Barbera, Joseph, and Anthony Macintyre. Medical and Health Incident Management 
(MaHIM) System: A Comprehensive Functional System Description for Mass 
Casualty Medical and Health Incident Management. Washington D.C.: Institute 
for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management, George Washington University, 2002. 
Bass, Robert, M.D. Testimony before the Emergency Preparedness, Science, and 
Technology Subcommittee, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of 
Representatives, July, 26, 2006. 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ocga/testimony/A_Nation_Unprepared_for_P
ub_Health_Disasters.asp [last accessed January 24, 2009]. 
 124
Brafman, Ori, and Rod A. Beckstrom. The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable 
Power of Leaderless Organizations. New York: Penguin Group, 2006. 
Bryson, John M. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2004. 
Clancy, Carolyn M. “Emergency Departments in Crisis: Implications for Disaster 
Preparedness.” American Journal of Medical Quality 22 (2007): 123–126. 
Covey, Stephen M.R. The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything. New 
York: Free Press, 2006. 
"Disaster Plans Often Neglect Materials." Hospital Materials Management 28 no.12 
(December 2003): 2.  
Edwards, Nicholas A., David G. E. Caldocott, Tony Eliso, Andrew Pearce, “Truth 
Hurts—Hard Lessons from Australia’s Largest Mass Casualty Exercise with 
Contaminated Patients.” Australasian College for Emergency Medicine (2006). 
Epley, E. E., R. M. Stewart, P. Love, D. Jenkins, G.M. Siegworth, T. W. Baskin, and 
Cocke R. Flaherty. “A Regional Medical Operations Center Improves Disaster 
Response and Inter-Hospital Trauma Transfers.” American Journal of Surgery 
192 no. 6 (December 2006): 853–59. 
Evans, Bruce. “Despite Efforts to Date, EMC Problems Remain.” Fire Chief Magazine. 
November 2006. http://firechief.com/ems/firefighting_despite_efforts_date/ [last 
accessed September 28, 2008]. 
Garrett, Laurie. Betrayal of Trust: The American Public Health Infrastructure in an Age 
of Antigovernmentalism. New York: Hyperion, 2000. 
Hogan, David, and Jonathan Burstein. Disaster Medicine, 2nd ed. New York: Lippencott 
Williams and Wilkens, 2007. 
Hu, Jer-San, Wen-Hui Yang, and Ya-Yen Chou. "Classifying Healthcare Network 
Relationships: An Analysis with Recommendations for Managers." International 
Journal of Management 23 no. 3 (September 2006): 665–678. 
 125
Hupfeld, Stanley. “Evolution of the American Hospital System, Subspecialization and 
Physician Ownership.” 
http://www.circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/full/109/20/2379 [last accessed June 
13, 2008]. 
Iroquois Healthcare Alliance. “Joint Commission Emergency Management Standards 
Effective January 2008.” 
http://www.iroquois.org/cmt/cf/documents/JCAHO%20EM%20Standards%20Jan
.%2008.doc [last accessed January 23, 2009]. 
Joint Commission. “Accreditation Programs.” 
http://www.jointcommission.org/AccreditationPrograms/ [last accessed January 
16, 2008]. 
Kellison, T., D. E. Hogan, V. Gonzalez, and R. F. Frantz. “Immediate Hospital Impact of 
the Oklahoma City Bombing.” 2004 International Conference on Medical 
Consequences of Terrorism. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Israel Trauma Society, June 15–17, 
2004. 
Kim, Chan W., and Renee Mauborgne. Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested 
Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2005. 
Kunstler, James Howard. The Long Emergency: Surviving the Converging Catastrophes 
of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005. 
Lister, Sarah. The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority 
and Funding, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL33579, June 23, 
2008. 
Lohn, Jonathon, Kevin Fong, and Simon Whithey. “Medical Perspective on Mass 
Casualty Trauma.” Crisis Response 4(1): 36–38. 
Los Angeles Times. "U.S. Emergency Services Are Unprepared for Crises, Reports Find; 
Hospitals and Response Units Lack Coordination, Supplies and Staff to Deal with 
Major Disasters." June 15, 2006.  
Magee, Mike. Health Politics: Power, Populism and Health. New York: Spencer Books, 
2005. 
 126
Maldin, B., C. lam, C. Franco, D. Press, R. Waldhorn, E. Toner, T. O’Toole, and T. 
Inglesby, “Regional Approaches to Hospital Preparedness.” Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Strategy, Practice, and Science 5 no. 1 (2007): 43–53. 
McGlown, Joanne K., ed. Terrorism and Disaster Management: Preparing Healthcare 
Leaders for the New Reality. Chicago: ACHE Management Series Health 
Administration Press, 2004. 
Meyers, Susan. “Disaster Preparedness: Hospitals Confront the CHALLENGE.” Trustee: 
The Journal for Hospital Governing Boards 59 no. 2 (February 2006): 12.  
Natarajan, Nitin. “National Imperative to Establish a Domestic Medical Intelligence 
Center.” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians. EMS Fast Facts. 
http://www.naemt.org/aboutEMSAndCareers/ems_statistics.htm [last accessed 
December 15, 2008]. 
National Institute of Aging, National Institutes of Health, “65+ in the United States 
Report.” http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/mar2006/nia-09.htm [last accessed 
December 10, 2008]. 
O'Reilly, Kevin B. "Delegates Urge More Effective Use of Doctors in Disaster 
Response." American Medical News 48 no. 44 (November 28, 2005).  
Peck, Richard L. "Double-Check for Disaster." Nursing Homes 56 no. 4 (April 2007).  
Price, Waterhouse, Cooper. Closing the Seams: Developing an Integrated Approach to 
Health System Disaster Preparedness. Health Research Institute, 2007. 
Rodríguez, Havidán, and Benigno E. Aguirre. “Hurricane Katrina and the Healthcare 
Infrastructure: A Focus on Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Resiliency.” 
Frontiers of Health Services Management 23 no. 1 (Fall, 2006).  
Sabatino, Frank. “Stories of Survival: Hurricane Andrew.” Hospitals 66 no. 24 
(December 20, 1992). 
 127
Simon, Ronald, and Sheldon Teperman. “The World Trade Center Attack: Lessons for 
Disaster Management.” Critical Care 5 no. 6(2001): 318–320. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC137379/ (last accessed March 
2009). 
Solomont, E.B. “Nursing Homes Take on New Roles as Hospitals Struggle,” New York 
Sun, April 14, 2008, www.nysun.com/new-york/nursing-homes-take-new-roles-
as-hospitals-struggle/74630/ (last accessed August 14, 2008). 
United States General Accounting Office. “Hospital Preparedness [Electronic Resource]: 
Most Urban Hospitals have Emergency Plans but Lack Certain Capacities for 
Bioterrorism Response.” August 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03924.pdf 
[last accessed May 17, 2009]. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, Rev. 68, March 30, 2007, 
Section 30-1. “Categories of Ambulance Services.” 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/Downloads/bp102c10.pdf [last accessed 
January 7, 2008]. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. “Emergency Care 
Coordination Center,” http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/eccc/index.html [last 
accessed September 22, 2009]. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. “HaVBED Users Guide 
(DRAFT).” August 22, 2008, Version .5. 
https://havbed.hhs.gov/default/docs/HAvBED%20User%20Guide.pdf?PDFPROT
ECT=11d263a332d551f86b394bccdd99a0fd358510e1|1258261980#PDFP [last 
accessed September 22, 2009]. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. “The Hospital Preparedness 
Program (HPP).” http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/hpp/ [last accessed September 
22, 2009]. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. Medical Surge Capacity and 
Capability: “A Management System for Integrating Medical and Health 
Resources During Large Scale Emergencies.” Washington D.C.: CNA 
Corporation, August 2004. 
http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/discussion/planners/mscc/index.html [last accessed 
November 28, 2009]. 
 128
United States Department of Homeland Security. “FY 2009 Homeland Security Grant 
Overview.” November 7, 2008. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grant-
program-overview-fy2009.pdf [last accessed October 16, 2009]. 
———. “National Preparedness Guidelines.” September 2007. 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf 
[last accessed September 22, 2009]. 
Upton, Lori A., Mary H. Frost, and Douglas H. Havron. "Operationalizing a Regional 
Unified Medical Command." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 3 no. 2 (2006): 1–12. 
Volk, Steven. “Saving America’s 911 System.” 
www.msnbc.com/id/28368691/print/1/displaymode/1098/ [last accessed January 
21, 2009]. 
The White House. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21. Washington, D.C. 
October 18, 2007. 
Wingrove, Gary, and Aaron Reinert. “Dude, Where’s the Ambulance?” EMS Magazine. 
June 2008. 
http://www.emsresponder.com/publication/pub.jsp?publd=1&issueld=79 [last 
accessed January 9, 2009]. 
 129
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Eric Epley 
Southwest Texas Regional Advisory Council 
San Antonio, Texas 
 
4. Doug Havron 
Southeast Texas Regional Advisory Council 
Houston, Texas  
 
5. Sharon Nalls 
City of Houston Emergency Management 
Houston, Texas 
 
6. David Hogan, M.D. 
Integris Southwest Medical Center 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
